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# CURRENT HISTORY

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# CURRENT HISTORY

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## EDITOR'S NOTE:

The age demanded an image  
of its accelerated grimace.

—Ezra Pound

Ours is the age of images, images that only a few years ago captured the triumphant destruction of the Berlin Wall; a defiant Boris Yeltsin clambering aboard a tank to rally Muscovites during the Soviet coup attempt; the huge New York City ticker-tape parade for the US troops who had fought in Operation Desert Storm—the war that capped George Bush's vision of a new world order. Now the front-page photos and evening news clips show the grim reality of that "new order": dead and starving children in Somalia; emaciated Muslim prisoners in Bosnia; maimed victims of land mines crowding the streets of Phnom Penh. Yet the graphic illustrations of the death and destruction that have been visited on the sites of cold war superpower conflict mask another reality not captured by camera or television: the specter of a supra-capitalism riding roughshod over the nation state and the global environment; the paralysis that grips a cold war-security system as it is pressed into (in)action in places and situations for which it was not designed; the creeping realization that the naysayers of yesteryear were right, that there may indeed be limits to growth.

Some dispense with these concerns by holding forth a microchip-induced future of "clean" industries and a genetically engineered revolution in food production that allows us once again to resolve the Malthusian dilemma. The authors in this special issue take a different tack, arguing that maintaining the present path is bereft of vision and certainly the route to increasing world entropy. New ways of looking at the world that are not locked in a "post-" cold war understanding but that formulate a "pre-" twenty-first century concept of world order and its problems are required. The following articles represent a first attempt at just that.

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The bipolar world that lasted almost a half-century is gone, but what exactly is in the process of taking its place? A unipolar world? A multipolar world? As Richard Falk suggests, the questions being asked start from the wrong premise: "World order as traditionally conceived in terms of territorial states, their conflict patterns, and their particular internal tensions has reached a historical dead end of dangerous and tragic proportions. Only by conceiving of world order in its global dimension can we find grounds for hope and fruitful directions for struggle and effort."

## In Search of a New World Model

BY RICHARD FALK

The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, vividly described the present historical mood during his confirmation hearings in the United States Senate: "Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of."

The Soviet Union, of course, is the slain dragon, and what was tracked were the familiar structures of conflict associated with the long period of the cold war. In the new global setting nothing seems altogether familiar or simple. There are many smaller dangers, not just one large one. But even the smaller ones—ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, religious fundamentalism in the Arab world, and possible nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan—are poisonous in character, threatening to United States interests, and of an ambiguous nature. And such dangers are "small" only by comparison with the imagery of a world war between superpowers relying on huge arsenals of nuclear weapons. Within their immediate geographic scope, these post-cold war problems threaten cataclysmic results with genocidal implications (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

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### THE SHORT-LIVED "NEW WORLD ORDER"

In the months after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President George Bush spoke in a different vein, suggesting the likelihood of "a new world order" premised on respect for international law and made secure by an effective United Nations. These uplifting sentiments expressed in part the lingering exhilaration over the end of the cold war, a feeling that with the collapse of the Soviet challenge the world was a safer place—and could be made safer still if the challenge posed by an evil, reckless Saddam Hussein were met.

In this sense, the Persian Gulf War appeared as a watershed between past and future, a test of whether the possibilities for peace and justice in international relations that had been created by the end of the cold war could be realized and even institutionalized. It now seemed feasible to establish a global security system of the sort envisaged by President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I: a system based on norms, administered by international institutions, and resting on the commitment of leading states to the maintenance of peaceful international relations. What seemed to make such a project plausible was the absence of ideological rivalry or fundamental conflict among states.

In retrospect, the Gulf War was an ambiguous interlude in a wider process of restructuring that has been going on since the cold war's end. From some viewpoints Bush's efforts to rally a response to Iraqi aggression were a brilliant success, fully consistent with optimism about the setting up of a law-based global security system in place of the war-based geopolitical system resting on military capabilities and

alliance relations. Broad diplomatic support was achieved for a strong riposte by the UN, including backing from several key countries in the region. The UN Security Council was able to reach agreement on an approach that was effective and consensual, authorizing first sanctions, then military force to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

The countries spearheading the coalition opposed to Iraq, especially the United States, ensured UN effectiveness by making available sufficient military capabilities, along with an impressive resolve to provide diplomatic leadership. Iraq was compelled to withdraw from Kuwait and even to open its borders subsequently to UN inspection teams seeking to identify and destroy any sign of weapons of mass destruction. Collective security under UN auspices had carried out its basic mission, and had done so quickly, with surprisingly little loss of life on the prevailing side. The new world order, one would have thought, had been successfully established, and one might have expected Bush to continue celebrating it as the crowning achievement of his presidency, especially in light of the approval with which Americans greeted the war's outcome.

As Bush claimed at the time, the victory in the desert also served to erase, once and for all, the still painful memories of American defeat in Vietnam. More to the point, the military operation organized in Washington, code-named Desert Storm, demonstrated that American defense technology was capable of achieving a spectacular victory in a short period against a seemingly formidable third world enemy. Such a demonstration would put to rest the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome," which made the American people reluctant to support interventionary diplomacy if it involved large-scale military operations. Further, the one-sided outcome of the Gulf War was thought to teach the Islamic world (perceived by many Americans as the new focus of evil in the aftermath of the collapse of communism) a vital lesson—that the Christian West was in control, and thus its economic and strategic interests could not be threatened by Islamic forces without dire and humiliating consequences.

The results of the fighting also reshaped the debate over power relations after the cold war. Most conservative commentators wrote glowingly about "the unipolar moment" of indisputable American ascendancy in the field of global security, which brought both the opportunity and responsibility to spread American values far and wide while upholding United States interests. Only months before, Paul Kennedy's "decline" thesis had been fashionable among foreign policy pundits, with many advisers and experts agreeing with the Yale historian that the United States was overextended and losing out in the world economy to both Japan and Europe. But after the dramatic win in the gulf, the policy implications of the thesis were abruptly put aside. Despite mounting evidence of

economic deterioration at home and abroad, the new enthusiasm about America's global prospects set the tone for foreign policy debates.

Yet even amid the patriotic fervor there were solid reasons to doubt that the mood would last and to question the whole episode's diplomatic implications. To begin with, the United States government had seemed to be acting mainly on its own in the war, making the UN Security Council appear more a rubber stamp for American foreign policy than an independent actor forging a new system of collective security. Further, the war had a series of distressing secondary effects. Despite the media hype about precision bombing of military targets, reliable eyewitness investigators reported severe damage to Iraqi society. Also, the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiite Muslims in the south, both of whom had been encouraged during the encounter to rise up against Baghdad's authority, were left after the cease-fire to the untender mercies of Saddam Hussein's fury. Such complacency toward the sufferings of the Iraqi people continues with the retention of harsh international economic sanctions against Iraq, which inflict hardship on civilians without increasing pressure on the leadership. And then—perhaps most damaging of all, at least in terms of appearances—was the survival in power of Saddam Hussein, as demonic as ever, yet emerging as something of a popular hero throughout the Arab world because he stood up to the West.

More surprising was the apparently cynical reversal, shortly after the cease-fire, by leading United States officials who now believed it was actually beneficial to keep Saddam in place in order to ensure the unity of Iraq and the containment of Iran and Islamic fundamentalism. These latter concerns were once again seen as posing the main threats to Western strategic interests in the region. Such a shift in geopolitical gears, although understandable in the pragmatic domain of foreign policy, left a bad taste in the public's mouth, a public that only weeks earlier had been mobilized around the notion that Saddam Hussein was the most reprehensible political leader since Hitler.

Additional disenchantment arose from White House behavior. At first, Bush basked in the sunshine of popularity, having engineered the military victory without spilling much American blood and at no monetary cost to the country. But even as returning soldiers were honored in victory parades, the uncertainties of the outcome cast a lengthening shadow. More and more Americans asked just what had been achieved by the win over Iraq. Besides, they began to feel that George Bush was acting more like the "President of the World" than of the United States, and this despite a serious recession at home that was causing growing social distress.

Also relevant was the grim realization that Saddam Hussein was not the only poisonous snake out there.

The situation in Yugoslavia was heading toward the disaster of unbounded ethnic violence, given a criminal edge by genocidal Serbian actions. As Yugoslavia collapsed, the United States government stood by like a spectator while casualties mounted and evidence of atrocities accumulated. Bitter questions were asked. What happened to the grandiose expectations nurtured during the Gulf crisis about a new world order? Was the new world order more concerned with oil than people? What had become of United States leadership, and its promise to take advantage of the availability of the UN Security Council?

Other troubling developments helped create a growing impression of disorder in the post-cold war world, and even a certain nostalgia for the order imposed on international relations by the all-encompassing superpower rivalry. Several former Soviet republics were already in the throes of large-scale civil strife, and even worse was on the horizon. There were humanitarian emergencies in several African countries, the most serious in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Liberia. The efforts to restore peace in Afghanistan and Cambodia were proving far more difficult than anticipated. Unlike the challenge posed by Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, no simple military response seemed relevant. The Middle East peace process, initially treated as a diplomatic dividend of the Gulf War, seemed stalemated, and even the mid-1992 ascent to power of the Israeli Labor party was not seen as moving negotiations much closer to a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

## A SOUNDBITE STICKS

Given all this, it is not surprising that the White House quietly abandoned the phrase "the new world order." But, intriguingly, neither the media nor international dialogue followed suit. Frequent references to the new world order continue to be made, although the intentions behind them differ. On one side are those, especially outside the United States, who refer to the new world order as the global structure of power and authority in the aftermath of the cold war. For them, the new order is either unipolar, with the United States emerging as leader and sole superpower; or multipolar, with power and authority shifted from the military-security domain to that of economic and financial policy and influence dispersed among Europe, Japan, and the United States.

In the third world, because of the American authorship of the term, the new world order has been treated from the beginning as neither more nor less than a plan for Pax Americana, and this line of interpretation persists. No one in the third world seems to notice or care that United States leaders have stopped referring to the new world order.

Whether or not the words are used, the American project to control North-South relations is taken for granted. The only matters deemed worthy of consider-

ation in third world circles are assessment of the specific effects of United States geopolitical ambitions on the various regions of the world, and analysis of whether America's financial weakness will significantly influence the country's political behavior in the years ahead, especially with respect to the interventionary diplomacy of the sort practiced during the cold war.

A more conservative line of discussion in the North, strongly represented in the mainstream media, retains the new world order as a normative yardstick by which to measure the adequacy of foreign policy and UN activity in any given setting. For instance, in relation to the atrocities in Bosnia, editorial writers lament the impotence of the United States response by noting the White House's refusal to uphold the promise of the new world order, and so on. The hidden premise behind such editorializing is that the United States has responsibilities of global scope, and that its leadership role requires a readiness to use its military capabilities and to intervene as necessary in the internal affairs of foreign countries for a range of goals, including preventing the spread of nuclear weaponry and promoting market-friendly democracy.

In other words, by ironic circumstance, despite the abandonment of the phrase by the United States and growing despair about the incidence of disorder in the world, the search for coherence has given "the new world order" a weird, almost ghostly, afterlife that has little to do with its triumphal origins in the Iraqi desert. Thus the backdrop for inquiry into the state of the world in 1993 is this conceptual tension between relying on an optic that stresses "order" and an impressionistic sensibility that transmits the salience of "disorder" or "entropy." In this respect the transition from new world order to new world disorder has been completed in a very short time.

## WHY ENTROPY?

The excitement and hopefulness of 1989 already seem part of a distant past. At the time, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the electrifyingly rapid process of German unification that dramatized the end of the cold war were both welcome and unexpected developments of such extraordinary magnitude as to generate a tidal wave of optimism about the future of international relations. And this hopeful pattern of course extended beyond Germany. The countries of eastern Europe recovered their political independence after decades of bureaucratic grayness and cruel domestic repression—arrangements that had appeared virtually permanent given the rigidity of the cold war blocs.

This high drama of emancipation was carried to new heights the following year, as the Soviet Union itself repudiated communism and shortly thereafter collapsed. The old Soviet internal empire was superseded by 15 independent states. These new political entities were all committed in some way to achieving transition



at breakneck speed to a Western-style political order and market-based economy.

During this same period, democratizing movements were challenging established authoritarian political arrangements elsewhere in the world: civilian leadership reemerged in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile; multi-party democracy was introduced in several African countries; and impressive democratic challenges were mounted in China, Thailand, Burma, Nepal, and South Korea, although these were largely unsuccessful. Then there was the startling reversal of position by the white leadership in South Africa on the core matter of race relations, including its totally unexpected readiness to abandon apartheid and agree on a transition to black majority rule in a multiracial democracy.

Democracy seemed, despite the several Asian reversals, to be sweeping across the world. It was an exhilarating time. No wonder the temptation to draw momentarily optimistic conclusions proved irresistible. Neoconservative writer Francis Fukuyama rode this wave of triumphalism proudly proclaiming the "end of History," insisting that the values of market-oriented constitutionalism had decisively proved their superiority over all rival approaches to the organization of political and economic life.

How can we come to understand what went wrong? Why the poisonous snakes? One easy explanation is connected with purely structural approaches to world order that regard the cold war world as a positive arrangement of power because of its bipolarity. Thus two adversary superpowers, each capable of destroying the other in retaliation for an attack, organized much of the world into opposing alliances; a reasonable strategic balance was achieved that created a state of mutual deterrence in relation to vital interests, and had the incidental effect of containing and suppressing lesser tensions. Such a balance did not preclude tests of will at the periphery, as in the third world, producing such costly and devastating wars as those that took place in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Concentrating on relations at the core, however, the historian John Lewis Gaddis, in a description that proved influential, termed the cold war "the long peace."

When bipolarity collapsed, the discipline of the bloc system also was lost. There was no longer an enemy to serve as a focus for a unified response. Without an enemy, there is less reason to ignore other social forces. The lack of correspondence between the territorial boundaries of states and the ethnic identification of people gave rise to intense new political conflicts, especially in settings of economic disparity and ideological tension. The eruption of these conflicts in areas long subject to Communist domination partly expressed the fury of impoverished peoples who had been denied the opportunity to act politically. In effect, the disorder manifest in the 1990s was earlier disguised by the repressive discipline of bipolarity and the

related worry that instabilities in either bloc could spin out of control, leading to the worst-nightmare scenario—a nuclear war between the superpowers.

A complementary account of global disorder revolves around a critique of the initial triumphalism after the fall of communism. In reality, the defeat neither validated the claims of capitalism nor amounted to a health certificate for the West. True, the bankruptcy of Soviet-style socialist governance was revealed, but moving from its failed legacy to an alternative political and economic order was far more difficult than was at first appreciated. Also, the generalized suppression of the Soviet era had had the unappreciated benefit of sparing Europe and Asia the torment of unresolved ethnic rivalries. The breakdown of repressive authority brought these back to the surface of political relations, and the result was chaos.

The ideological point is more subtle and complex. It is now obvious that liberation from Communist repression does not lead easily to the sort of moderate and affluent political economies that exist in western Europe and North America. Whether such a goal is even partially attainable remains open to question. If no new and more preferable system emerges in formerly Communist countries, the appeal of new extremism is almost certain to grow.

Beyond this, the internal realities of capitalist countries are producing some disturbing problems. A prolonged and deep economic recession has driven up chronic unemployment in affluent countries, exacerbating, for example, the scandal of homelessness in the United States. The globalization of the world economy, with its accompanying new divisions of labor and capital, continues to marginalize certain regions and industrial sectors, with little hope for their recovery. Such troubles are aggravated by the demographic and environmental pressures that are adding to the plight of the poor in the North and the South.

The conflict and civil strife, as well as the economic desperation, is inducing large-scale migrations of people from the poorer nonwhite countries to richer white countries. Given the economic challenges already confronting these societies, economic and racist resistance is growing with respect to foreigners and refugees. Indigenous political patterns are also discouraging, especially the spread of fundamentalist politics in Africa and Asia. The rise of Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism is in part a symptom of the failure of secularist politics to solve the basic problems of poverty in the third world while at the same time relinquishing cultural identity in the face of westernizing influences.

It is obvious, then, that the ending of the cold war gave political space to long-suppressed tensions and also coincided with frustrations in the third world related to a successful development process. Of course, overcoming the sterility and militarism of the cold war era remains beneficial in many respects, including the

elimination of any threat of World War III. However, the post-cold war challenges are in certain respects more fundamental and pervasive, making it increasingly accurate to conceive of the new world order as the new world disorder.

### RECOVERING HOPE BETWEEN THE EXTREMES

It is not desirable to adopt either the early post-cold war overoptimism or the more recent dark pessimism. Additional developments offer solid ground for constructive action, and even hope, although history shows there are no guarantees for happy endings.

Most interpretations of the end of the cold war and the widespread disorder that has ensued ignore the relevance of globalizing tendencies in international life. Increasingly, matters of economic and environmental policy raise challenges that are global in scope, or at least regional. The world is now linked in a manner that enables global communication, whether the concern is the news or popular culture. Market forces are also unifying the globe, embodied in the franchise outlets that range from the McDonald's arch to the Mickey Mouse T-shirt. Democratic social forces are also increasingly organized on a transnational basis.

The hundreds of grass-roots environmental groups that took part in the counter-conferences held during the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro attest to the growth of an environmentalism motivated by a human or global identity. This extension of an identity beyond traditional categories of nation, race, class, gender is even more evident in the context of human rights, underpinned by citizens associations with a transnational mandate. Amnesty International, the various Human Rights Watch groups, and the Helsinki Citizens Assembly are characteristic, each notable for concerns that are much wider than the boundaries on maps or the geopolitical cleavages between states.

Reinforcing these trends are the increasing destructiveness of large-scale war and the related danger of widely dispersed weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. The Gulf War was in part fought to deprive Iraq of nuclear weapons. Pressures are currently being brought to bear on North Korea, and Iran and Pakistan. The global reach and destructive magnitude of modern weaponry make it increasingly anachronistic to conceive of international security by reference to the sovereign rights of territorial states.

These various factors suggest that our conceptions of world order, whether new or old, are caught up in an unproductive either/or between the geopolitics of the cold war and the hyper-nationalism of the 1990s. Neither of these works from the perspective of the well-being of the peoples of the world, and both are oblivious to the two sets of globalizing tendencies—from above as conditioned by market forces in collaboration with leading states, or from below in the form of transnational, grass-roots democratic forces. This inter-

pretation suggests that a geopolitically driven type of world order characteristic of the cold war is militarist and suppressive, whereas an ethnically and nationality driven world order, as is currently manifest, is fraught with extreme violence and anarchy.

At the same time, a market-driven alternative, as represented by the effort to constitute free trade regimes in Europe and North America, will accentuate the gaps between North and South and neglect the plight of the disadvantaged everywhere. Globalization-from-above, by way of market and state forces, is also antidemocratic in operation and spirit. However, if balanced by globalization-from-below—that is, by democratic social forces gradually organized in the shape of transnational networks that together comprise what might be described as an emergent "global civil society," the conditions exist for a future world order that benefits all the world's peoples.

The benefits can be assessed by looking at the promotion of human rights; the protection of the environment; the avoidance of warfare, militarism, and arms races; the strengthening of international institutions; the development of effective transnational democracy, including holding political leaders accountable and enabling participation on behalf of global civil society; and the muting of hyper-nationalism and religious fundamentalism through the wider distribution of political authority, especially through regional economic and political initiatives.

World order as traditionally conceived in terms of territorial states, their conflict patterns, and their particular internal tensions has reached a historical dead end of dangerous and tragic proportions. Only by conceiving of world order in its global dimension can we find grounds for hope and fruitful directions for struggle and effort. This is not a call for globalism as such. On the contrary. Another negative scenario for the future arises from the prospects for globalization-from-above: a world order shaped to suit the priorities of markets and finance capital, weighed down by antidemocratic manipulations, and tied to an anti-environmental endorsement of a consumerist ethos of human fulfillment.

But there is hope and political space for creative initiative. The endorsement of human rights and constitutionalism establishes a foundation on which globalization-from-below can evolve to balance and neutralize the negative features of globalization-from-above. It is from this interactive play of opposing forces that one can envision a new world order that serves the human interest, and yet is rooted in the realities of political trends. To envisage a future world order entirely shaped by transnational democratic forces would be naive and utopian. To conceive of a creative tension emerging out of various beneficial and detrimental globalizing tendencies seems sensible, although the outcome is by no means certain to be positive. ■

"Like a religious militant strong in his faith, the American government did not see that it had any hard choices to make" in its foreign policy during the cold war. But the new Clinton administration, Gaddis Smith says, will be the first in a half-century to face really difficult choices in determining America's role in the world.

## What Role for America?

BY GADDIS SMITH

**H**ard Choices was the title Cyrus Vance selected for his memoirs of his days as secretary of state in the Carter administration. Vance's message was that problems of foreign policy seldom have clear, unequivocally correct solutions. Every course carries cost and risk; success is never guaranteed.<sup>1</sup>

But for 50 years—from the entry of the United States into the war against Japan and Nazi Germany in 1941 to the end of the cold war—American leaders had no difficulty affirming an overriding purpose: to prevail against a perceived threat to the very survival of the United States. A sense of necessity overcame moral qualms and encouraged action even when outcomes were uncertain. Difficulty lay only in settling on the most effective means, and even then the decisions were not really very hard to make.

Thus the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 1945 was not a hard choice, nor was support of a brutal undemocratic government in Greece in 1947. The defeat of Japan justified the former, and containment of the Soviet Union the latter, as it would hundreds of what were not very hard choices for another 40 years. As NSC-68, the famous National Security Council memorandum on the Soviet menace, put it in 1950: "Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purpose of frustrating the Kremlin design. . . ."

Thus it was easy for the Eisenhower administration to decide to intervene covertly in Guatemala in 1954 and overthrow the country's democratically elected president; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that shutting "international communism" out of the Western Hemisphere warranted the attendant secrecy, lies, and gross violation of treaty obligations.

Thus those who directed the war in Vietnam realized they were opposing the struggle of the Vietnamese people for independence, and also knew that military tactics were inflicting death and injury on civilians. But for them, the Communist element in Vietnamese nationalism justified what America was doing. In the end victory could not be achieved, but holding to the objective of crushing the Vietcong and humbling North Vietnam was not a hard choice.

Thus for decades the United States built up the lethal power of the nation's nuclear arsenal, concealing injury to the environment and to nuclear workers, and accepting that the use of nuclear weapons would probably kill hundreds of millions of people and possibly even end human life on earth. The rationalization here was the mirror-image Soviet nuclear threat and the notion that any risk should be taken to ensure deterrence or, failing that, relative superiority at the end of the dreadful day when the missiles were actually launched. Again, it was not hard for American presidents and their advisers to choose the nuclear route; the difficulties lay in the details of weapons design, target selection, and arms control strategies.

### THE HISTORY LESSON

American leaders during this period were confident they had discovered a grand historical pattern that showed what the role of the United States in the world must be, and that provided a rich store of usable analogies. The starting point for this application of the past as guide was the international situation during and after World War I, when German militarism and the Bolshevik revolution threatened the balance of power and a liberal, open world. President Woodrow

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<sup>1</sup>Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).



Wilson had roused America from its traditional isolation into responsible world leadership—the first phase of the cycle. But the Senate and the American people rejected Wilson's vision, and the United States refused to join the League of Nations or take other steps to "make the world safe for democracy." In the 1920s and 1930s the cycle turned to isolationism and irresponsibility.

With the rise of aggressor powers and the outbreak of war in Europe and Asia, the next generation of American leaders saw the consequences of Wilson's failure. Facing a situation analogous to and even more dangerous than that during the Great War, they felt that this time the United States must respond more rapidly and with greater commitment. This led to the defeat of Hitler's Germany and Japan by 1945. At this point fear of seeing the cycle repeated acquired renewed power. We must, said every advocate of international leadership for the United States, remember 1919 and prevent a second retreat into isolationism. We must, they said, work for a prosperous world economy, and be militarily prepared and politically engaged with allies who share our fear of a new totalitarianism worse than Hitler's—Soviet communism.

Every American president from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan invoked a rolling sequence of historical analogies. The United States must never again dismantle its armed forces as it did after 1918, never again be a party to appeasement; Americans must strive to carry out the vision of Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The arguments for two decades of American involvement in the war in Vietnam were a towering scaffold of analogy: the United States must sustain the willingness to run risks that it had demonstrated during the Berlin airlift, the Korean war, and the Cuban missile crisis, keeping in mind that an aggressor rewarded is an aggressor strengthened. Like a religious militant strong in his faith, the American government did not see that it had any hard choices to make.

For most of the half-century of certainty-through-analogy, the United States possessed the relative and absolute economic resources necessary for translating aspirations into power. But with the end of the cold war, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the recognition of serious economic weakness at home, comforting analogies that cast the United States as the defender of freedom against the ambitions of evil empires ceased to rally public support for expensive enterprises. No longer could the question, "Which course will most contribute to 'frustrating the Kremlin design'?" be asked at every turn and be seen to yield the definitive answer on where the United States must go. Blithe justifications for doing bad things in a good cause evaporated. No longer could it be argued that guns should have priority over butter, and congressional assent for higher defense budgets and federal

deficits could not be won by warning that the nation's survival was at stake.

The cold war had also simplified the national security establishment's task by shortening time horizons. Any insistence on planning for a decade, a century, a thousand years hence could be met with the rejoinder that the Soviet threat was here, now, and capable of being activated in minutes—the proverbial flight time of an intercontinental ballistic missile. How could policymakers focus on a distant future when the immediate task was to assure that there was a future?

## FACING A NEW WORLD OF TROUBLE

The difficulties of the new era were first encountered by President George Bush, but were then temporarily masked by the popular war the United States led against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was for America a quick fix of old-time confidence in the lessons of history; Saddam was even portrayed as another Hitler. But when he did not meet Hitler's fate, remaining defiantly in power, the exaltation wore off. Bush lost the popularity with the American people that might have brought him reelection, and in January 1993 Bill Clinton moved into the White House.

Clinton's administration is the first since 1941 to face really hard choices. The country confronts more severe domestic social and economic woes—unemployment, poor and expensive health care, the deficit—than at any time since 1933, and Clinton has promised to give them first priority. He proclaimed in his inaugural address, "There is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with America," echoing FDR's assertion 60 years before that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"—neither of which is or was entirely true. By implication the Clinton formula invited Americans to look exclusively inward and to think of foreign policy only as something to keep the United States out of trouble.

But the world's troubles were numerous and painful beyond endurance. The February 7, 1993, *New York Times* listed violent conflicts in 48 countries, omitting several others. Where was the worst hell—Bosnia, Armenia, Zaire, Haiti? Which posed the greatest threat to humanity—ethnic violence, famine, overpopulation, or the deteriorating environment?

Slowly, hesitantly, the Clinton administration began to fashion its foreign policy. The old cold war verities were of no use, but even older ideals remained: national self-determination, democracy, the impermissibility of outside intervention in the internal affairs of foreign nations, respect for human rights, support for the United Nations, and foreign policy based on the informed will of the people and carried out through a partnership between president and Congress. During the cold war these ideals had been invoked instrumentally, not as ends in themselves, and were violated as

the occasion demanded. Conflicts among different ideals seldom inhibited action.

But now the most salient characteristics of American foreign policy were the conflict among ideals and the difficulty of establishing priorities. For example, was it more important to support Israel as an exemplar of democracy or condemn it for violating the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories? Was the expensive humanitarian intervention in Somalia precedent for doing the same elsewhere, or did a starving population's chance of succor depend on the extent of television coverage and the logistical ease of intervention?

The most important clash of ideals involves relations with Russia and the smaller independent countries that formerly comprised the Soviet Union. President Wilson during World War I proclaimed that a nation's right to self-determination was the foundation of international justice. He disagreed with Secretary of State Robert Lansing's caution that self-determination could lead to chaos, and he was not pleased by Lansing's reminder that the United States existed because the Confederacy's claim to self-determination had been denied at the cost of 600,000 lives. From Wilson's day onward, twin approaches coexisted in American foreign policy. The concept of self-determination was invoked against enemy empires. The virtues of integration—with the United States itself cited as an example—were extolled on other occasions, most notably in the Marshall Plan of 1948 and in the course of continuing support for the European Community.

When the Soviet Union began to crumble under the faltering leadership of President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 and 1991, Bush spoke with the voice of Lansing rather than Wilson. He and his friend Gorbachev foresaw a grim future if the "Union" disappeared from USSR that included ethnic violence, economic catastrophe, and intractable difficulties in arms control. In a speech delivered in Kiev in August 1991, Bush maintained, "Freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred." The president's words could not turn the tide of nationalism or prevent Gorbachev's fall; by the end of the year the Soviet Union was no more and Gorbachev had become a private citizen. But Bush as prophet of doom was not all wrong, and the Clinton administration now faces difficult decisions on how to influence events in the vast reaches of the former Soviet empire.<sup>2</sup>

The former Yugoslavia presented a more immediately pressing problem. Wilson rejoiced in 1919 at the

birth of self-determined nations in eastern Europe—Yugoslavia among them. But when in 1991 Yugoslavia began to break into separate states and became convulsed with bloody ethnic strife—Serbs against Croats, Serbs against Muslims, Croats against Muslims—Bush reacted as he had toward the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The administration deplored extreme nationalism and urged the peoples of Yugoslavia to work and live together within their larger confederation. But these hopes proved futile. By 1992 the intensifying violence was centered in the former republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it primarily involved attacks on Muslims by ethnic Serbs supported by Serbia, the most powerful and ambitious Yugoslav successor state. The United States participated in international economic sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia plus Montenegro), and in relief operations for the Bosnian Muslims, especially in the besieged city of Sarajevo, but did little more.

This January former Secretary of State Vance, now the special envoy of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, joined with Lord Owen, a former British foreign secretary representing the European Community, in recommending a Wilsonian solution: the division of Bosnia into 10 autonomous regions along ethnic lines. The new Clinton administration found itself studying a plan that appeared to reward Serbs for their brutality—which violated an American ideal. Additionally, enforcement of the Vance-Owen proposal could require the use of American troops. And could those forces be deployed without violating another ideal: explicit congressional approval of such military actions? But to do nothing would likely mean more rape, more murder of almost genocidal dimensions, more general suffering—and violation of the professed American commitment to human rights.

Closer to home, Haiti provoked another battle of ideals. For decades the United States had condoned brutal Haitian dictatorships as unpleasant but necessary alternatives to communism. Finally, in early 1991, a popular, freely elected president, the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide, took office—and lasted nine months before being toppled in a military coup on September 30. The Bush administration deplored this blow to democracy, and participated through the Organization of American States in porous economic sanctions against the usurping regime, but took no effective steps to return Aristide to his rightful place. Restoring him could well have called for armed intervention, violating the ideal of nonintervention. As Article 15 of the OAS charter declares: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."

For Washington, Haiti was primarily a refugee problem; tens of thousands of Haitians were fleeing from poverty and political repression (the two being

<sup>2</sup>See Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

difficult to distinguish from each other) and toward the United States in small, overcrowded wooden sailboats. The Coast Guard intercepted many of the vessels, deposited some of the refugees in a makeshift camp at the American base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and ultimately returned most to Haiti—*notwithstanding* their claims to a well-founded fear of political persecution. During the presidential campaign, candidate Clinton said the full legal rights of Haitians to demonstrate the legitimacy of their bids for political asylum should be respected—an ideal of United States and international law. Yet days before the inauguration, Clinton announced he would continue the Bush policy of intercepting and sending back the refugees without review lest, in violation of another ideal, the United States become responsible for a heavy loss of life on rough winter seas. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations backed a UN effort to send observers to Haiti to supervise Aristide's negotiated return and the restoration of democracy. If that effort failed—and recent history gives little cause for optimism—the hard choice would then be between letting political repression continue or intervening militarily.

Meanwhile, the approximately 24,000 American troops and the other members of the 32,000-man-strong international mission in Somalia appeared to have achieved their immediate objective of ending the famine in that African country. Clinton unequivocally supported this popular humanitarian but armed intervention initiated in the closing days of the Bush administration, but was also happy to see some of the American forces come home after just six weeks. What degree of intervention, however, might be required to create a stable, democratic, nonviolent government in a Somalia devastated by factional warfare? And what criteria should the United States apply in deciding on humanitarian intervention, when there are many cases of human misery comparable to Somalia's? More hard choices.

## A WIDENING AGENDA

An active UN presence in scores of troubled places around the globe has become possible with the ending of the cold war because the United States and the Soviet Union no longer veto proposals backed by the other. Support for the UN is certainly an old American ideal, but it too contains contradictions. Decision-making power in the UN lies with the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council: the United States, Russia (which has taken over the Soviet Union's seat), China, France, and the United Kingdom. In 1945 the five more closely approximated the world's top tier in population and power in its various

manifestations than they do today. In population they now rank, respectively, 3, 6, 1, 16, and 17 in the world. The United States backs Japan (seventh in population) and Germany (twelfth) as new permanent council members. But their confirmation would further tilt power within the UN toward the industrial world, leaving all of Latin America and Africa, as well as India and Indonesia (second and fourth in number of people) still without a seat on the council. But the UN desperately needs money. Should power go with economic resources, or more accurately reflect population?

A deeper conflict in ideals pits the principle of nonintervention against the notion that gross violations of human rights and other extreme failures to meet international norms can annul a government's sovereign immunity against intervention. But the permanent members of the Security Council can protect themselves from any UN intervention through their veto power. Does this mean the UN is headed back toward a form of colonialism—at best a resurrection of the idea of trusteeship for people unable to govern themselves, at worst a return to an international version of Theodore Roosevelt's corollary that "flagrant . . . wrongdoing or impotence" renders certain nations subject to the application of "international police power"? Which nations? Small and accessible ones like Haiti or Somalia, perhaps. But what of large countries, and what of "wrongdoing or impotence" in the former Soviet republics? Yet more difficult choices for the United States and the UN.

No area holds sharper conflicts among ideals than international environmental policy. The Bush administration adopted a whining attitude of limited cooperation at the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, the so-called "Earth Summit," held last year in Rio de Janeiro. Clinton has promised to take environmental issues far more seriously than his predecessor, and not make a false dichotomy between jobs or environmental action. But how does a democracy, with leaders who can be replaced at the polls, convince its citizens to make sacrifices whose benefits may not be apparent for decades? On the crucial issue of population control, what balance should be struck between individual freedom, religious principle, and mandated limits? For years the United States has tried to exclude such questions from foreign policy—yet in the long term, is anything more vital?<sup>3</sup>

The understandably high priority the Clinton administration places on creating jobs in the United States leads to difficult choices in the realm of international trade. The idea that free trade is essential for prosperity in the United States and worldwide is two centuries old. In the present century Americans have repeatedly linked free, amicable trade with democracy and peace. Trade makes jobs; jobs make people happy; happy people do not turn to dictators and aggression to solve their problems. The theory was compatible with self-

<sup>3</sup>For a succinct review of environmental policy issues, see Richard N. Gardner, *Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities after Rio* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).



interest in the decades of unequaled American productivity and technological superiority. Later, Washington did not strenuously object when friendly nations acquired competitive advantages over the United States, since their economic strength contributed to the "free world's" superiority over the Communist world. In the 1990s the compatibility of free trade and national interest is not so obvious. What is evident is that differences in resources, geography, and the internal arrangements of societies make absolute free trade a fiction. But what combination of free trade, managed trade, and outright protectionism should the United States invoke? This question is most irksome for relations with Japan, with which the merchandise trade deficit last year was \$44 billion.

Overhanging all the other trying choices that confront the Clinton administration is the question of how

much money should be spent in support of foreign policy, and for what purposes. The administration has encountered opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff over proposed cuts in the armed forces. Appropriations for "soft" purposes—payments to the UN, contributions to environmental programs, humanitarian relief, foreign aid of various kinds—are far less than the military budget but far more vulnerable to the cry that the government should satisfy the needs of Americans before trying to do good all over the world. During the campaign Clinton stressed Americans first and said very little about foreign affairs. Not since Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 has a president chosen to concentrate almost exclusively on domestic affairs—and the results then were mixed at best. Clinton is unlikely to have that choice. ■

In this era, when keeping track of the number of times the superpowers can destroy the world is obsolete, attention has shifted to the number of brushfires cropping up in the world. As Michael Klare points out, it remains to be seen whether international organizations are up to the challenge of extinguishing them or whether they will be allowed to rage because of international inattention, inactivity, and indecision.

## The New Challenges to Global Security

BY MICHAEL T. KLARE

For 45 years, from World War II's finish to the end of the cold war, most agreed that the greatest threat to global security was an all-out war between the two superpowers that would culminate in the use of nuclear weapons. Fearing this, government officials and concerned citizens sought to diminish the risk of nuclear conflict through intensive diplomacy, improved crisis management, arms control, and cultural and other exchanges. Because of these efforts and the reforms that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion in 1985, the risk of a superpower conflict has largely vanished, and the world no longer dreads a nuclear conflagration.

The post-cold war era, however, is by no means free of the threat of armed conflict, as demonstrated by continuing warfare in areas as diverse as Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Indonesia, Kashmir, Liberia, Peru, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and the former Yugoslavia. While these conflicts do not have the potential to erupt into a nuclear holocaust, they do pose a threat of widespread regional fighting with fearsome death tolls and destruction. Moreover, as weapons of mass destruction be-

come more widely diffused, a growing number of these regional wars will entail a risk of chemical and even nuclear attack. Preventing, controlling, and resolving these conflicts, and impeding the spread of advanced weaponry will, therefore, constitute the principal world security tasks of the 1990s and beyond.

### THE SHIFTING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

A metaphor popular among analysts thinking about the current reshaping of the world is that of "tectonic motion," or the movement of the giant "plates" that make up the earth's rocky crust. Because this movement can reshape continents and alter climates—sometimes cataclysmically—through the earthquakes and volcanoes it produces, it serves as an apt analogy for the end of the cold war and other dramatic changes now occurring throughout the world.<sup>1</sup>

The geological metaphor conveys the scale of the changes now under way around the globe and illustrates how surface events are the product of deeper sociohistorical forces. Thus we sense that the drive for democracy and human rights in Russia and eastern Europe is related to similar pressures in Myanmar, Chile, China, Haiti, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand. The image of tectonic motion also suggests the havoc wreaked by the breakup of large empires and federations (notably the Soviet empire and the old Yugoslavia) and the fracturing of established alliances such as the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser degree, NATO.

But to adequately describe the security environment of this era after the cold war, the tectonics metaphor must be supplemented by an additional image—one that captures the profusion of ethnic, tribal, religious, and national conflicts that we are witnessing today. Imagine a piece of glass laid over a map of the world and then struck by a large, heavy weight: the result would be an intricate web of cracks across the world, with heavier concentrations in some areas but with none left entirely unscathed.

These cracks represent the many fissures in our multiethnic, multiclass, and multilingual societies—

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<sup>1</sup>As the historian John Lewis Gaddis has observed, "Like the tectonic forces that move continents around on the surface of the earth," the end of the cold war and other recent developments suggest a massive shift in the "historic tectonics" of human civilization. John Lewis Gaddis, "Tectonics, History, and the End of the Cold War" (Columbus, Ohio: Occasional Paper from the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1992), p. 4.

the divisions between rich and poor, black and white, Hindu and Muslim, Muslim and Jew, Czech and Slovak, Serb and Croat, Azeri and Armenian, and so on. The fissures are stressed by the tectonic shifts occurring beneath the surface, but it is along their jagged lines that the battles of the post-cold war era are being fought.

The fractured-glass analogy suggests the multiplicity of conflictual relationships in the world. Just consider for a moment the situation in the Middle East, which is not just a conflict between the Arab states and Israel, or between Iran and Iraq, but rather a far more elaborate configuration of animosities. In Lebanon, for instance, it involves Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, the Druze, and Palestinians; in Syria, the Alawites and other Muslims; and in Iraq, Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. A similar diversity in the conflictual pattern is found in the former Yugoslavia, and in the Caucasus region of what was once the Soviet Union.

Each of these images—tectonic motion and fractured glass—is helpful in identifying features of the current world security environment. However, to best describe this environment it is useful to combine the images: tectonic movements causing massive shifts beneath the surface that in turn accentuate and extend the cracks appearing on the surface. By assessing both the tectonic movements and networks of cracks, we can arrive at a comprehensive picture of current world security issues.

### FIVE FORCES THAT SHAKE THE WORLD

It is risky, of course, to attempt an analysis while the world is still undergoing transformation. But enough has already occurred on the surface for us to be able to begin to understand what is happening below. Five tectonic shifts in particular are worthy of discussion:

#### *The Pull of Economic Forces*

There was a time, not so long ago, when the "fate of nations" was determined largely by political and military factors—most significantly, the ability of the state to marshal a country's resources for war, conquest, or defense. Today the state remains a major international actor, but its capacity to organize resources for its purposes has been circumscribed by what has been called "supranational capitalism." As the economist Robert Heilbroner sees it, the global nexus of multinational corporations and international financial institutions has accumulated vast power and influence at the expense of national capitalism and state agencies. This, Heilbroner notes, endows suprana-

tional capitalism with the ability "to rearrange the global division and distribution of political and economic power"—a capacity that, when exercised, is often "seismic" in its impact.<sup>2</sup>

Obviously it is impossible to establish a one-to-one correlation between broad economic phenomena and specific world events. But that the failure of the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites to keep pace with economic growth in the West contributed to the debilitation of Communist regimes is certain. Unable to generate funds for investment in economic and social revitalization, these regimes stagnated and lost what remained of their political legitimacy. The eventual result was a rapid slide from power, with what had become a corrupt and demoralized ruling class putting up little resistance.

The same economic forces are now exacerbating intergroup conflicts around the globe. Because some groups and societies have adapted more successfully than others to the competitive pressures of global capitalism, socioeconomic divisions in multinational states are becoming more visible and pronounced, provoking increased conflict between those on opposite sides of these rifts. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be partially attributed to the desire of the country's stronger economic units, Croatia and Slovenia, to break away from their less advantaged fellow republics and integrate more closely with the western European economies. Similarly, the breakup of Czechoslovakia can be explained in part by growing resentment in Slovakia over the faster pace of economic activity in the Czech Republic.

Perhaps even more destabilizing is the widening economic gap between the industrialized "North" and underdeveloped "South." Although some third world countries have in recent years managed to join the ranks of the more affluent nations—one thinks especially of the newly industrialized countries of the Pacific Rim—most of the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have seen the difference between their standard of living and that of the wealthier nations widen over the past decade. At the same time, the global spread of Western culture and consumption patterns via the mass media have inculcated an appetite for goods and services not attainable by the masses of the poor and unemployed. The result is increased North-South tensions ranging from the growing militancy of political and religious movements with anti-Western themes (movements, for example, like the Maoist Shining Path in Peru and the Islamic Jihad in Egypt) to more South-to-North drug smuggling. Depressed economies in the South are also behind the rise in migration to the nations of the North—itsself a growing cause of violence in the destination countries.

<sup>2</sup>Robert L. Heilbroner, "The Future of Capitalism," in Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, ed., *Sea Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), pp. 114–115.



### *The Global Diffusion of Power*

The rise of supranational capitalism has been accompanied by a diffusion of political, military, and economic power away from the United States and the Soviet Union, the two main poles of the cold war era, to other actors in the international order. This has been in progress since the 1950s and 1960s, when the western European countries and Japan began to recover from the devastating effects of World War II and many third world nations secured their independence; it gained further momentum in the 1970s and 1980s with the slowdown of economic growth in the United States and the Soviet Union and the acquisition of major military capabilities by emerging third world powers. The process culminated in 1989–1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting disappearance of the bipolar world.

As of yet, no clearly defined system of power relationships has developed in place of the bipolar system and the tight alliances of the cold war period. Rather, a number of regional power centers—Japan in Asia, Germany in Europe, Russia in central Euroasia, the United States in North America—have emerged, each surrounded by a cluster of associated states. These centers cooperate with each other in some matters and compete in others; states not aligned with any of the principal clusters manage as best they can.

The diffusion of political and military power and the realignment of global power relationships have multiple implications for world security. With the erosion of superpower influence and the proliferation of modern weapons, newly strengthened regional powers see an opportunity to pursue their hegemonic ambitions, often provoking fierce conflict in the process (as in the case of Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran and its 1990 invasion of Kuwait). Furthermore, the collapse of central control over the periphery of what was the Soviet Union has resulted in a series of ethnic and territorial clashes between former components of the empire. And the worldwide diffusion of nonnuclear weapons has contributed to the duration and intensity of insurgencies and civil and ethnic conflicts.

### *Increased Popular Assertiveness at the Grass-Roots Level*

Paralleling the growth of globalized economic institutions and the diffusion of political power among international players is the increased assertion at the local and national level of "people power." Wherever we look in the world today, we find grass-roots citizens movements striving for fundamental change in key social, economic, and political structures. In some areas, including the Philippines, China, Haiti, eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, this assertiveness has entailed a drive for democratic rights; it has also, however, appeared as anti-foreigner sentiment in Germany and increased anti-Semitism in Russia.

By far the most potent manifestation of this grass-roots assertiveness is the militant expression of ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious affiliations by peoples who have previously lived peacefully in multinational, multicultural societies. This expression takes many forms: the calls for secession by the constituent nationalities of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the militant assertion of Hindu fundamentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt; the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq and the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka; and the Palestinian intifada. As suggested by Myron Weiner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Peoples"—however they identify themselves by race, religion, language, tribe, or shared history—want new political institutions or new relationships within existing institutions"; when accommodation is not forthcoming, they are likely to escalate their demands.

The growing assertion of populist claims, whether of a political or an ethnic nature, has significant implications for world security. At the very least it is jeopardizing the ability of current leaders from North and South, East and West, to hold on to power. In many areas it has led to violent clashes between members of opposing groups. And in Yugoslavia it has created a maelstrom of ethnic fury that threatens to engulf much of southeastern Europe.

### *The Diminishing Power and Authority of the Nation-State*

Caught between ever more powerful supranational capitalism on one side and restive populations on the other is the modern nation-state. Although still among the actors with the most clout on the international stage, the state is steadily losing ground to international financial institutions and well-organized ethnic and religious constituencies. This is evident both in the ability of the International Monetary Fund to dictate government spending practices in many third world and eastern European countries, and in that of Muslim clerics to affect foreign policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

To a great extent, the decline in the power of the nation-state is a product of a global revolution of rising expectations at a time of increased international economic competition. As Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University observes, people still "count on their state to play the game of wealth effectively," and thus attain or protect high standards of living. But state authorities have less control over their economies than ever before, and when they fail to satisfy popular expectations invite popular revolt—through electoral channels where that option exists, through rioting and civil strife where it does not.

The replacement of older, unrepresentative regimes by new, popularly backed governments in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere has not, unfortunately, always resulted in greater social stability. In many cases the

new regimes have played the game of wealth with even less success than their predecessors, resulting in widespread discontent and a risk of coups and mob action. To retain their hold on power, some of these regimes—most notably that in Serbia—have turned to ultra-nationalism as a solution, thereby provoking fresh outbreaks of ethnic violence. In other cases, such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Peru, the state has lost control over wide areas, ceding authority to local warlords and sectarian forces; in extreme cases, the state has simply withered away, giving free rein to the sort of gang warfare seen in Liberia and Somalia.

### *Population Growth and Environmental Decline*

The erosion of the state's power and authority has been accelerated, in many instances, by a fifth tectonic force: rapid population growth and the emergence of harsh environmental limits. Population growth is not by itself a cause of instability—historically, it has often contributed to the health and vigor of societies, as in the case of the United States. But when population increases exceed the rate of economic growth (as in many third world countries today), and when they contribute to the depletion of valuable resources (such as tropical forests and tillable soil), the ability of states to engage in long-term economic and social development is impaired—thus ensuring worse hardship and unrest in the future.

The world's population now stands at about 5.5 billion people, and this figure is expected to double by the middle of the twenty-first century. Such a jump could theoretically be sustained if the planet's resources were evenly distributed, and if new products were developed to replace those natural substances being depleted. But resources are not evenly distributed, and new products might not be available at an affordable price to all who need them. As things stand now, many states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (where population growth rates are at an all-time high) are not able to provide for burgeoning numbers of young people, and will be even less able to do so in the future. The consequences include a rising incidence of hunger and malnutrition, increased migration from the impoverished countryside to urban shantytowns, soaring unemployment (especially among youths), and the growing appeal of extremist movements.

Even if population growth is stabilized, the world must still contend with the problems arising from human-induced degradation of the environment. Much has been written about the long-term effects of global warming and the depletion of the atmosphere's ozone layer, and on their implications for human, plant, and animal populations; much less, however, is known about the impact of environmental decline on intergroup and interstate relations. Preliminary research suggests that environmental decline, especially when it occurs in environmentally stressed areas of the third world (deserts, rainforests, hillsides, coastal lowlands) will exacerbate intergroup competition and conflict and drive yet more people into crowded urban shantytowns where the prospects for meaningful employment are dim and the danger of unrest is high.<sup>3</sup>

### **BREAKUP, BREAKDOWN, AND BLOW-UP**

These tectonic forces act on the peoples, states, and societies of the world in such a way as to exacerbate existing tensions between groups and in many cases to provoke or intensify conflict. The resulting struggles take several forms, all of which have become all-too-common features of the global environment.

One manifestation is the world's decomposing empires and superstates. By far the most striking products of the cold war's end and communism's demise have been the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union was both an empire, assembled through centuries of conquest by the Russian czars and their Communist successors, and a modern superstate, uniting many individual nations in one centrally administered, confederated system. Yugoslavia also possessed attributes of empire and confederation. Systems of this sort can survive only when the center possesses enough strength to subdue separatist pressures in the periphery, and when there are sufficient social, economic, and political links between the disparate parts to resist the centrifugal forces that inevitably tear at such an assemblage.

With the collapse of communism—the binding agent in both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—and the growing impact of tectonic forces, these two superstates broke up in 1991, and the individual groups that had constituted them sought to establish full sovereignty over (what they viewed as) their rightful territory. As suggested by past instances of imperial decomposition, such as the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires after World War I, the process inevitably spawns discord and conflict. Pieces of the decomposing empire fight over the demarcation of new international boundaries (hence the fighting between Croatia and Serbia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan), and ethnic minorities find themselves trapped within alien and inhospitable states (hence the struggles of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia, the Ingush and Chechens

<sup>3</sup>These findings emerge from the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, a joint study of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Program on Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Toronto. See Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey Boutwell, and George Rathjens, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict," *Scientific American*, February 1993, pp. 38–45; Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict," in Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, *World Security*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

in Russia, the ethnic Russians in Moldova, and the ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region of Serbia).

Such struggles are not limited to the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; other multinational superstates are feeling the vibrations of tectonic forces. Hence the survival of Canada remains in doubt as the French-speaking people of Quebec continue to seek greater autonomy from the English-speaking provinces, while India has experienced significant separatist pressures in Kashmir, the Punjab, and Assam. Ethiopia, once an imperial kingdom, has long been troubled by armed separatist movements in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, and is likely to experience renewed conflict if these pressures are not relieved. Two other third world superstates, China and Indonesia, continue to encounter resistance on their peripheries (the former in Tibet, the latter in East Timor) and will likely come under intensified pressure from separatists in the future.

Accompanying the breakup of large multinational states has come a surge in ethnonationalist and irredentist struggles as ethnic groups that have been denied a state (or have had theirs submerged in a larger multinational entity) seek to establish one, and as other groups already in possession of a state seek to enlarge it so as to incorporate adjacent territories occupied by large numbers of their kinsmen. Such impulses have long sparked fighting, but seem to have gained renewed vigor in recent years as the bipolar system broke and the balance of power between state authorities and populist elements shifted in favor of the latter.

As has been noted, ethnonationalist forces are evident in the separatist struggles in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, China, and Indonesia. Other groups engaged in like struggles include the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shan and Karen peoples of Burma, and the Basques of France and Spain.

Major irredentist struggles include the Serbians' campaign to create a "Greater Serbia" out of the remnants of Yugoslavia, Armenia's push to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh (now controlled by Azerbaijan), Russia's drive to repossess the Crimean peninsula (which was ceded to Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev), and China's continuing efforts to repossess Taiwan. Many fear that irredentists in Hungary will press for the incorporation of Hungarian-speaking regions of Slovakia, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia in a "Greater Hungary."

## REGIONAL RIVALRIES

The rivalries engendered by the breakup of larger states will be paralleled by regional rivalry. The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion of political power have given added impetus to rivalries between regional states, especially in East Asia, South

Asia, and the Middle East. Of particular concern are the ongoing rivalries between China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, India and Pakistan, India and China, Iran and Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Israel and Syria. These have all flared up periodically in the past, but they seem to have gained renewed intensity in recent years as the inhibiting influence of the superpowers declined and the regional power equation became more unsettled. Several of these contests could experience a fresh outbreak of fighting in the latter 1990s.

Factors that will come to bear on such rivalries include: the degree of progress (or lack of it) in regional peace negotiations, especially the Middle East peace talks; the degree to which these states are hobbled by internal power struggles; the ability of the United States—now the world's sole superpower—to discourage adventurism on the part of regional powers; and the impact of global economic conditions on these states' inclinations to engage in external conflict. No one can predict how these factors will play out in the years ahead, but it is reasonable to assume, for example, that a breakdown in the Mideast peace talks, coupled with a decline in United States influence and/or the emergence of aggressive-minded leaders in one or more states would increase the risk of a new regional conflagration.

Another key factor in all of this is the effect of weapons proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals. All the states named above are engaged in major military buildups—in many cases involving weapons of mass destruction—and thus each has reason to fear the arms acquisition programs of its adversaries. Should any of these powers achieve a sudden and unexpected increase in its military capability—through, say, the acquisition of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles—it could invite a preemptive strike by a rival. Such strikes have taken place before—for example, the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor—and are all too likely to occur again.

## REVOLUTIONARY AND FUNDAMENTALIST CRUSADES

Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely dissipated, revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an attraction for downtrodden and dispossessed peoples. Such movements promise not merely a change of leaders but a sweeping transformation of society, typically involving the elimination of existing institutions and their replacement by more "righteous" or egalitarian structures. Movements of this sort appear to be gaining strength in areas where economic conditions have worsened for the majority (or for particular groups) and where the capacity or inclination of state authorities to overcome widespread impoverishment and inequity has diminished. Revolutionary and millenarian groups in such areas appear increasingly willing to employ violence in their efforts to reform society.



At present two main types of revolutionary crusade can be discerned: ideological or political movements, usually attempting to end exploitation of the poor by the middle class and the rich; and religious fundamentalism, entailing a drive to subject all societal interactions to religious law and practice. Examples of the first type include the Shining Path in Peru, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El Salvador, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the New People's Army in the Philippines; examples of the second category would be the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata party in India, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and the various Islamic fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan.

Finally, the world is confronted with an assortment of pro-democracy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically in strikes or civil disorders and/or to provoke repressive violence by the authorities. All these movements reflect the tectonic increase in grass-roots activism described earlier, and while they may experience setbacks in the short term are not likely to disappear anytime soon.

They include: popular drives for Western-style electoral democracy and human rights, as have been working themselves out in Burma, China, Haiti, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Zaire; struggles by disenfranchised minorities and majorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments, from Northern Ireland to South Africa; and efforts by subject peoples to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule (even though the "colonizers" involved may be other third world countries), as in East Timor, Kashmir, the Western Sahara, and the West Bank and Gaza. Paralleling these movements are the increasingly vigorous efforts of indigenous people to reclaim rights and lands that have long been denied them by the dominant cultures.

### **WILL WEAPONS INHERIT THE EARTH?**

Adding to the dangers posed by all the factors described above is the global proliferation of modern weapons and the technologies for producing them. Such proliferation entails not only the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction—but also a wide range of "conventional" arms—the tanks, planes, guns, and missiles used by regular military forces. Both sorts of weapons are finding their way into the arsenals of more and more nations, thereby stimulating local arms races and ensuring that future wars will be fought with ever-ascending lethality and destructiveness.

In the nuclear realm, the five declared nuclear weapons powers (the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China) have been joined by three undeclared nuclear ones (Israel, India, and Pakistan), while Iran, Iraq, and North Korea continue their efforts to develop such weapons and Argentina, Brazil, South

Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan retain a capacity to do so in the future. (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited some nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but have pledged to turn them over to Russian authorities. Still, many analysts worry about the possible spread of former Soviet nuclear materials and technology.)

As for chemical weapons, American intelligence officials have identified 14 third world countries believed to possess an offensive chemical warfare capability: Burma, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Many of these nations have also engaged in research on biological weapons, and have acquired ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads. We have already witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and in Iraq's subsequent campaign to liquidate Kurdish villages in strategic border areas. Iraq also threatened chemical attacks against Israel in 1990 and 1991, and Israeli officials responded with threats of possible nuclear retaliation. Central Intelligence Agency officials have reported that India and Pakistan were prepared to use nuclear weapons in 1990, when it was feared the fighting in Kashmir would spark a full-scale conflict.

The proliferation of advanced conventional arms has proceeded apace with that of weapons of mass destruction. According to estimates by the Congressional Research Service, third world countries spent \$339.5 billion on imported weapons from 1983 to 1990 (in constant 1990 US dollars)—which translates into (among other things) some 13,010 tanks and self-propelled guns, 27,430 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,920 supersonic combat planes, 38,430 surface-to-air missiles, and 53,790 surface-to-surface missiles. These weapons sustained the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988 and other regional conflicts, and swelled the arsenals of emerging powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Security analysts are also worried about the growing diffusion of advanced conventional weapons. As military spending in NATO and the former Warsaw Pact falls, arms manufacturers in these countries, whether state-owned or private, are increasingly disposed to export their products to the third world, where the demand for modern weapons is high and the likelihood of their being used in combat is growing. The stockpiles built up by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the cold war era constitute a vast reservoir of surplus arms that are increasingly finding their way into the black market—and thence into the hands of terrorists, guerrillas, separatist forces, and other irregular formations that threaten the peace in many areas of the world.

Proliferation of arms of all types is certain to figure as a primary security concern in the 1990s and beyond because it helps increase the number, length, and

duration of conventional conflicts and also increases the risk that future wars will involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, whether deliberate or accidental.

## KEEPING THE PEACE

The tectonic forces currently in motion and the growing tempo of internal, local, and regional conflict have placed enormous strain on the international community, forcing world leaders to consider new and enhanced methods of conflict control. The development and application of these to actual conflicts are likely to remain a central issue in security affairs for the foreseeable future.

With the cold war over and the superpowers no longer assuming responsibility for maintaining peace and stability within their respective spheres of influence, a greater burden has naturally fallen on the United Nations, which has responded by greatly expanding its peacemaking and peacekeeping operations around the world. Between 1991 and 1992 the United Nations established 13 new peacekeeping operations—exactly the number initiated by the world body in the entire previous 42 years of its existence. At the start of 1993, United Nations peacekeeping forces were serving in Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, the Golan Heights, Kashmir, along the Kuwait-Iraq border, in Lebanon, Mozambique, the Sinai, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and the Western Sahara; all told, some 60,000 military and police personnel were involved in these operations, with the number expected to increase substantially in the months ahead.

These operations have contributed to stability in many parts of the globe and given the United Nations enhanced international visibility and respectability. And while some of the operations have run into difficulties, most observers agree that conditions in these areas would probably be much worse without the presence of the blue helmets. Nevertheless, world leaders generally agree that the United Nations' current capabilities and methods are inadequate for the wide range of conflicts and security challenges expected in the years to come. The Security Council has called on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his staff to suggest ways in which the organization's peacemaking activities can be improved, and development and implementation of these suggestions is likely to be the organization's top priority in the mid-1990s.

To inform the discussion on peacemaking, Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace* last June.<sup>4</sup> In this document, the secretary general identifies five key areas in need of improvement: preventive diplomacy, or the negotiated termination of conflicts; peacemaking; peacekeeping, or the use of United Nations forces to monitor cease-fires and to prevent the re-ignition of hostilities;

peace enforcement, or the use of force to prevent or resist aggression by a belligerent in violation of United Nations resolutions; and post-conflict peace-building designed to alleviate human suffering and thus eliminate conditions that might contribute to the renewal of fighting. Boutros-Ghali proposed a number of initiatives in each of these areas, and broke new ground by calling for the formation of a permanent peacekeeping force under United Nations control (the current system staffs such units with contingents drawn from national forces on an ad hoc basis).

The development of new approaches to local and regional conflict has also been a matter of great concern in the United States, which has been under great pressure to step in and resolve certain ongoing crises (notably those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia). While some American leaders would prefer to delegate all such activities to the United Nations, others, including both Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton, contend that the United States has an obligation to act in certain cases where no other option appears viable. Thus in December Bush, with only six weeks left in his term, ordered United States forces to Somalia in order to restore order in a country torn by factional warfare and to protect the delivery of relief supplies to starving Somalis.

In announcing Operation Restore Hope, the president indicated that the United States cannot assume such responsibility in every instance of regional disorder, but that it must be prepared to act when the survival of many human beings is at stake and when no other entity is available to do the job. "I understand [that] the United States cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement [and that] American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations." These comments, and the dispatch of American troops to Somalia, have sparked a heated debate in the United States over where and under what circumstances United States forces should be employed in such operations abroad.

Whatever the outcome in the United States and at the United Nations on the use of force in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, it is apparent that the problem of preventing and controlling local, ethnic, and regional conflict has become the premier world security concern of the post-cold war era. Because such conflicts are likely to proliferate in the years ahead, and because no single power or group is willing and able to guarantee global peace and stability, United States and world leaders will be forced to enhance existing peacemaking instruments and to develop new techniques along the lines suggested by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. How peaceful a world we inhabit in the twenty-first century will depend to a great extent on these endeavors. ■

<sup>4</sup>Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: The United Nations, 1992), p. 28.

The murderous intensity of newly fanned ethnic hatreds in the post-Soviet sphere surprised most, who considered such antagonisms confined to history textbooks. As Steven Burg points out, however, nationalism in all its forms is very much alive and, ironically, in some instances catalyzed by elements of the democratic forces that have swept the region.

## Nationalism Redux: Through the Glass of the Post-Communist States Darkly

BY STEVEN L. BURG

The wanton violence of the fighting taking place in the Balkans and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) has brought death and destruction to Europe on a scale not seen since the end of World War II; it threatens to destabilize not only the continent but other international communities. Because political boundaries rarely match ethnic boundaries, conflicts based on calls for ethnic self-determination inevitably threaten to involve neighboring states. And, as has been seen in the Balkans and Caucasus, once initiated, the violence of ethnic-based conflicts is easily escalated by individual acts of brutality into widespread death and destruction.

Failure to contain the conflicts that have already broken out, forestall future ones, and secure the democratization of the successor states of the former Soviet bloc would have a negative effect on the direct economic, political, and security interests of the West. Left unattended, the rise of nationalist regimes in eastern Europe, and the consequently increasing political appeal of nationalism in western Europe, may stimulate further violence by neo-Nazi and other ethnocentric groups in the West. The strong reactions such developments would bring from responsible governments, if sustained for long periods, might themselves become real threats to the foundations of liberal democracy. The military issues raised by continuing conflicts in the East, and intra-alliance differences over them, may stall the deeper development of the European Community and perhaps even erode the basic cohesiveness of NATO. It would almost certainly deal a powerful setback to the process of establishing a security framework among the North American, west-

ern European, and post-Communist states to replace the obsolete security architecture of the cold war.

The appeals of nationalist-separatist groups to the principle of national self-determination challenge the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and noninterference that have been central to the post-World War II international system. This challenge must be addressed if peaceful mechanisms for the resolution of ethnic conflicts are to be established, and the stability of the international system is to be preserved. This will inevitably require the careful redefinition of these postwar principles and the obligations arising out of them. The conflict between nationalism and democracy in the post-Communist states also presents a direct challenge to the ability of the United States to make human rights principles central to the international system.

### FROM CONTAINMENT TO INVOLVEMENT

As long as the Communist leadership in Moscow exercised hegemony over the states of eastern Europe, the United States and its allies had only limited involvement in the region. The artificial stability the Soviet Union imposed on the domestic and international relations of eastern Europe was also found in states outside direct Soviet control, where independent Communist regimes created domestic stability by force and refrained from upsetting the political balance between East and West. Although ideologically opposed to communism, the West accepted the apparent certainties of Soviet domination of the region and refrained from direct attempts to undermine it.

Although the United States adopted a strategy of "containment," it consistently refrained from becoming directly involved in the internal affairs of the Soviet bloc countries. Even when faced with outbreaks of popular unrest or mass opposition to Communist rule (as was the case in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia

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in 1968, and in Poland in 1979 and 1980), the West refrained from intervening directly. Paradoxically, it was the onset of détente and the collaborative Soviet-American effort to ratify the status quo that created new opportunities for change in eastern Europe.

In 1975, 35 countries—including those from the Soviet bloc, western Europe, and the United States—concluded the Helsinki Final Act. Although the Helsinki agreement ratified the international status quo, it also provided the basis on which the West and, more important, domestic groups in the Communist states, could pursue political changes in eastern Europe. The Helsinki Final Act included 10 basic principles that were to be used to evaluate the actions of the signatory countries. These included some that ratified the post-war configuration of states in Europe by establishing their sovereignty and territorial integrity, affirming the inviolability of their borders, and mandating nonintervention in their internal affairs. Other principles committed the signatories to peaceful relations by disavowing the threat or use of force and calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes; the principles also committed them to respect “human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination.” The act further established the right of peoples to determine their political status. In effect, the Helsinki principles made Western concepts of individual liberty and collective democracy the political standard, and applied that standard to all the signatory states, from the countries of North America to the Soviet Union.

One consequence of the Helsinki agreement, certainly unanticipated in the East and perhaps in the West as well, was the formation in the Communist countries of small but active dissident grass-roots political organizations to uphold these political standards. The increase in cultural contacts between East and West that followed the act also reinforced a process already under way among the broader, nondissident social elites in the East: the development of increasingly liberal political values and growing national consciousness. This liberalization of values and new emphasis on national identity contributed—once Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet system had introduced new opportunities for grass-roots political activity—to the re-emergence of national movements aimed at the establishment of independent states; in the end it also contributed to the collapse of communism.

The apparent marriage of liberalism and nationalism in the Communist states in the 1970s and 1980s echoed a similar marriage between these forces in

Central Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. That alliance led to the devolution of power to nationalist leaderships, but failed to produce democracy. The implosion of the Soviet domestic political order, the emergence of independent states in the former territory of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of new regimes in eastern Europe has produced an analogous devolution of power to the state. As a result, nationalism has again become a powerful legitimating force for new governments with uncertain bases of popular support. It remains to be seen whether these post-Communist regimes will be able to transform the bases of their legitimacy from nationalist to democratic principles. The increased salience of nationality has rekindled many of the ethnic issues of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And these, as they have in the past, may yet lead some of these states to more authoritarian arrangements.

### A BAD FIT: NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

The commitment and ability of a government to guarantee individual rights is a necessary element in solving any ethnic conflict. As the scholars Larry Diamond and Juan Linz have pointed out, “for all their procedural messiness and sluggishness, [democracies] nevertheless protect the integrity of the person and the freedoms of conscience and expression.”<sup>1</sup> Such protection is essential to ending the threat felt by individuals in situations of intergroup conflict and establishing interethnic peace. But the establishment of stable democratic regimes in the post-Communist states is also strategically important to Western security; democratic regimes are the strongest social foundations on which to build an international security framework.

The development of democratic regimes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the construction of a new framework for Euro-Atlantic security, are best served by linking Western aid to local efforts to establish democracy. It cannot be taken for granted that, because Communist authoritarianism has given way to more open electoral processes and governments, the new regimes are “democratic.” The loosening and even abandonment of state censorship and state-imposed limits on individual expression have indeed permitted the emergence of a multitude of citizens organizations of varying size and interests. And the introduction of competitive electoral politics has stimulated the formation of independent political parties. These expanded freedoms of expression, participation, and organization are essential to the democratization process. But the degree to which government institutions are becoming instruments for the representation of social interests and can impose accountability on the national leadership, not to mention the extent to which individual rights are protected, varies greatly from state to state.

<sup>1</sup>Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Preface,” in Diamond et al., eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Vol. 4: *Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

It is not clear that democratic regimes will be consolidated even where elements of democracy have already been established. In some cases greater openness has accelerated political and cultural polarization: witness the open expression of extreme nationalist, ethnocentric, and anti-Semitic sentiments, the organization of political movements based on these sentiments, and the eruption of violent ethnic conflict across the region. Local political leaders need to address this explosion of ethnic tensions, and Western assistance must support their efforts to do so in ways that help moderate conflict and ensure the effectiveness of democratic institutions.

Nationalism is distinguished from social movements that arise among other aggrieved groups by the powerful emotions associated with it. In extreme cases, nationalist movements evoke a willingness to fight and die on behalf of the cause. This derives from the notion that what is at issue is group "survival." Nationalist movements, however, cannot be understood as solely "primordial" in nature. They are most often also organizational vehicles for the articulation of arguments over rights, goods, status, power, and other material and political issues. Hence, the conflicts between Serbs and other groups in the former Yugoslavia, and between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh may be exceptional cases by virtue of the disproportionately powerful role primordial hatred has played and the extreme violence that has taken place. Their ultimate solution, however, must involve the redress of grievances over rights, status, and power that also motivate and mobilize the populations—and especially their leaders—in these conflicts.

The strength of nationalist political movements, the popular appeal of avenging long-held ethnic grievances, and the resultant escalation of ethnic conflict impede the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democratization involves the creation of stable political institutions and processes "that make conflict, change, and conciliation possible without institutional collapse."<sup>2</sup> Nationalist conflict suppresses the importance and, in some cases, even the emergence of multiple issues, demands, and interests as nationalist leaders try to subordinate all other issues. Nationalist movements usually demand autonomy and seek a separate existence, denying the reality of commonalities, shared interests, or even mutual dependence. Ethnically based claims to autonomy thus strike at the heart of the process of democratization, since they compete with individual rights-based legitimation of a liberal democratic order.

The political organizations characteristic of nationalist movements, and the state institutions and processes they spawn are therefore ill-suited to the conciliation of

competing demands. They tend to adopt exclusivist rather than inclusivist policies, and tend to extremism rather than moderation. In this way the politics of nationalism are contrary to the essence of the liberal democratic process.

The enormous hardships that have been imposed on the people of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by the transition from central planning and state ownership to market-based economies make it difficult, if not impossible, for governments to win popular support on the basis of the material benefits they can deliver. This heightens the effectiveness of a government's appeals to national sentiments. The declaration of "sovereignty," the establishment of cultural supremacy, or even the threat of military action are promises more easily delivered than an improvement in the standard of living. Moreover, such acts strengthen the state's power and secure the positions of political incumbents far more effectively than efforts to institutionalize civil liberties, which would facilitate criticism of the government and the activities of an opposition.

Attempts to legitimate even democratically elected governments through appeals to nationalism may unsettle relations between neighboring states. Expressions of concern for minority communities of ethnic brethren in neighboring countries, no matter how carefully constructed, may raise the specter of irredentist claims and stimulate nationalist responses among the neighboring ethnic majority. Given the changing historical/political status of territories throughout eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, real and imagined irredentist issues claims represent sources of potentially serious interstate conflict.

Nationalist legitimation of new states may also lead to actions that impede the development of internal democracy. Several post-Communist governments have attempted to redress the ethnic grievances of the majority or eponymous population through legislation that effectively discriminates against minorities. Already, new citizenship laws, laws on language rights, voting rights laws, and other legislation have heightened tensions between dominant and minority groups. The popular support these measures evoke suggests how difficult it is to establish a broad social and political commitment to the pluralistic concept of civil society that underlies Western liberal democracy. The prospect of successfully establishing the political culture of tolerance for differences that underlies American democracy, for example, appears to be especially limited.

The post-Communist regimes are experiencing a broad, multidimensional transition from the enforced integration, artificial homogeneity, and stability of communism to the more open and pluralistic patterns of public discourse and behavior associated with incipient democracy. The rapid multiplication of political groups and organizations, the narrowness of

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 385–386.

support for most of them, and in some cases the obviously satirical if not cynical intention behind their formation suggest that the eastern European and post-Soviet states are undergoing processes of social and political fragmentation. With only a few notable exceptions, political organizations and institutions in these states have yet to bring together diverse groups and reconcile their conflicting interests. Their inability to do so may reflect the absence of interests that bind their populations together. At the very least it suggests that such interests are now far less important to the population than those that divide them.

Even where common economic interests, for example, might provide a pragmatic basis for linking constituencies to a common administrative and political center, the power of nationalist-separatist sentiments among the populace makes it difficult for local leaders to act on them. Indeed, even the distribution of economic interests and resources themselves may be in dispute, held to be illegitimate legacies of the old regime for which contemporary compensation is due. In competitive elections, greater support—and therefore greater political power—may be gathered by exploiting the coincidence of regional economic differences and inclinations toward ethnic self-assertion than by advocating economic compromise and political unity. The perception of material conflicts in ethnic terms by the mass populace, the acceptance or exploitation of such ethnic definitions by elites, and the frequency with which conflicts defined this way produce violence, make the resolution of differences over the distribution of government functions and over economic and other issues much more difficult to achieve. If liberal democracy depends on the mastery by political leaders of the art of compromise, then a successful transition to democracy is made more difficult in eastern Europe because the new countries' leaders, facing populations whose nationalist aspirations are unconstrained by other competing interests and aspirations, enjoy little leeway in which to develop this art.

### THE TIES THAT DIDN'T BIND

In the post-Soviet states, the former Yugoslav states, and in Czechoslovakia, the transition from authoritarianism was turned into a simultaneous "end of empire" process. Once seen this way, intellectual, economic, and other groups who might otherwise have been inclined to support a transition to democracy were drawn toward more nationally determined positions. The Slovenian and Croatian challenges to rule from Belgrade, for example, stimulated a conservative and even reactionary response among some Serbs, whose earlier support for democratization proved less powerful than the appeal of Serbian nationalism. Similarly, the opportunity to establish an independent state proved more appealing to democratic activists in

Slovenia than the task of democratizing a common Yugoslav state. In Czechoslovakia, the alliance of Czechs and Slovaks opposed to communism soon disintegrated and electoral support in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic shifted to leaders and parties intent on pursuing regional interests at the expense of continued federation.

The rush to redress long-suppressed national grievances has also led in some cases to the partial legitimization, or re-legitimation of the antidemocratic aspects of national political history. The Fascist and Nazi collaborationist regimes established in Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia during World War II have been the object of public, and in some instances *de facto* official re-valuation by nationalist leaders. New governments in Lithuania and Slovenia have pardoned Nazi collaborators. These actions are one dimension of the reaffirmation of collective identities, and a reflection of the powerful urge to reject any negative judgments of them. They also reflect, however, how weak concerns are for individual and human rights in the contemporary politics of the region. The still overwhelming strength of collective identities makes efforts to distinguish between national-cultural communities and the actions of individuals, especially when they are government officials, very difficult. And such distinctions are essential to the success of a transition from nationalist to democratic bases of legitimation.

The supporters of democratization in the region thus confront a vexing dilemma: the collapse of authoritarianism has unleashed forces that make the establishment of liberal democracy difficult. Yet to suppress these forces would require actions that might make democracy impossible. Some accommodation of the national aspirations of local populations is essential in order to avoid violence, to strengthen the legitimacy of new democratic institutions, to motivate these populations to endure the sacrifices associated with transition and, not least of all, because of the moral virtue of doing so.

Democratically inclined leaderships in the region are, therefore, confronted with the task of establishing an enforceable boundary between democratically acceptable and unacceptable political behavior. This is an immensely difficult political challenge. Debate over this issue continues in the United States even after 200 years of institutionalized democratic experience. It should not be surprising, therefore, that this is so difficult to achieve in the post-Communist states. It is clear that these states cannot depend on either a mass civic culture or on their own accumulated legitimacy to insulate them from popular discontent; moreover, they do not have the resources to deliver sufficient benefits to their people to counterbalance the social, economic, and political hardships that confront them.



## THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

The fate of democracy in the successor states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union depends on both internal conditions and the international environment. On the international level, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and rising ethnic tensions elsewhere have stimulated efforts to find a new framework for international peace and security and the collective mechanisms to enforce it. The conflict in Yugoslavia has revealed the weaknesses of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or the "Helsinki process." They have contributed to concerns about the need to strengthen the peacemaking and peacekeeping capabilities of the UN. And they have underscored the importance of direct bilateral and multilateral negotiations among the post-Communist successor states to address and eliminate potential sources of conflict between them.

Despite the differences that have arisen, negotiations among the democratically elected governments of eastern Europe and their active engagement in the CSCE and other international organizations have contributed to peaceful relations among them. Their behavior reflects, in part, the powerful norms of negotiation, compromise, and peaceful behavior that prevail among democratic governments. Their behavior also stands in sharp contrast to that of authoritarian states, governments, and organizations in the region, which have resorted to force to achieve their goals. Events in the former Yugoslav states, in the Caucasus, and in Moldova make it clear that the use of force in pursuit of nationalistic goals threatens the stability of neighboring states and raises the prospect of direct military involvement by outside actors, including the West. The costs and controversy such involvement would create place a premium on preventing and resolving these conflicts before they turn violent. The peaceful character of dispute resolution between democratically elected governments, therefore, gives the United States and its allies a strategic interest in the consolidation of democracy in the post-Communist states that parallels their interest in establishing an international security framework.

Post-Communist Europe thus presents the United States and its European allies with important and difficult foreign policy challenges. More direct involvement in the region seems essential. This requires coordination with European allies, whose own interests in the region may, in some cases, differ from or even conflict with those of the United States. The task of meeting these challenges must be met in ways that contribute to the further integration of the Euro-Atlantic community, and especially to the institutionalization of mechanisms for the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict.

American policy must support the development of democratic governments in the region. It can do so

directly and through multilateral arrangements. American efforts must be multidimensional, addressing the social and political dimensions of democratic development, as well as providing direct economic assistance. Policies toward individual states must reflect the nature of the threat to democracy in that state. And where democracy is threatened by interethnic conflict, special efforts must be devoted to building counterweights to the appeals of nationalism.

Clearly, any external power—European or American—that attempts to impose solutions in these conflicts will find it difficult to achieve success. The challenge to the United States and its allies, therefore, is to find ways to structure conditions in such a way that the conflicting parties themselves recognize incentives to resolve their disputes and become willing to initiate and sustain efforts to defuse ethnic tensions. The Yugoslav crisis demonstrates the importance of concerted international action to prevent and resolve conflicts before they turn violent.

American policy must support the development of an international framework for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflict in the Euro-Atlantic community. This will require a multilateral effort to reconcile the conflicting principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference, human rights, and self-determination on which conflicting claims in specific cases are based. This effort, while difficult, can be coordinated with and reinforce efforts to promote the democratic development of new governments. Because no framework for peace can prevent all conflicts, the United States must also consider ways to strengthen, through the UN and regional organizations, the peacekeeping and peacemaking resources of the international community, both as a means of encouraging parties to accept negotiated solutions and in case enforcement action becomes necessary.

Although the dramatic events of recent years heighten the temptation to resort to political hyperbole, the West *does* confront a historic opportunity to encourage the democratic development of the formerly Communist regimes and aid in the emergence of a new framework for maintaining peace in the expanded Euro-Atlantic community. The collapse of communism by itself does not guarantee this will happen. The strength of nationalisms throughout the region provides a powerful instrument for the construction of new authoritarian regimes. The prospect of a nationalist authoritarian government in Russia, for example, offers dangers many orders of magnitude greater than those already created by such a government in Serbia. Ameliorating the nationalist threat to democracy in the post-Communist states, therefore, must be seen as a strategic goal of American foreign policy, one to which an appropriate level of American attention and resources need to be devoted. ■

# Ethnic Conflicts Worldwide

## Europe

**SPAIN** Nationalists saying they represent 3 million Basques seek an independent state on the border with France. Since 1968, 717 people have been killed in the country and 49 in France.

**GERMANY** Right-wing and neo-Nazi groups carried out more than 2,000 attacks last year on some of the 650,000 foreigners seeking asylum, resulting in 17 deaths and nearly 600 injuries.

**CROATIA** Serb separatists control about a third of the territory. An estimated 25,000 people have been killed since Croatia declared independence in 1991.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA** Serb forces have captured about 70 percent of the country and carried out an "ethnic cleansing" campaign that has expelled and killed Muslims and Croats and brought widespread condemnation. Tens of thousands of people are thought to have been killed.

**MOLDOVA** The mainly Romanian population seeks ties with Romania. The Dniester region in the east, where most of the population is of Russian and Ukrainian origin, declared independence in 1990, fearing the country would unite with Romania. About 800 people have been killed.

**GEORGIA** Abkhazia, a region dominated by Muslims, seeks independence or union with Russia. From 700 to 1,500 people are estimated to have been killed and 80,000 displaced in the fighting. South Ossetia, a region also dominated by Muslims, seeks union with the republic of North Ossetia in Russia. About 1,500 people are estimated to have died in the fighting.

**RUSSIA** Chechenya and Ingushetia seek greater autonomy within the country. Ingushetia and North Ossetia are fighting over territory in clashes that have killed more than 300 people.

**CYPRUS** About 150,000 ethnic Greeks were forced to leave the northern half of the country when it was invaded by Turkey in 1974. The UN has stationed peacekeeping troops and brokers talks between the Greeks and ethnic Turks.

## Middle East

**SUDAN** The government, dominated by Arab Muslims from the north, is fighting a longstanding insurgency by black Christians and animists in the south.

**EGYPT** More than 70 people have been killed in clashes between Islamic militants and government security forces and in attacks by militants on foreigners and Coptic Christians.

**ISRAEL** About 1,000 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli soldiers, 500 have been killed by fellow Palestinians, and about 100 Israelis have been killed in Palestinian attacks since the intifada erupted in 1987.

**AZERBAIJAN** Troops from Muslim-dominated Azerbaijan, aided by Russian forces, are fighting to end a rebellion by Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave within the country populated largely by Christian Armenians, who favor independence or affiliation with Armenia. An estimated 3,000 people on both sides have been killed since 1989.

**TURKEY** The Marxist Kurdish Workers party has sought a Kurdish state in fighting that has killed 2,500 since 1984.

**IRAQ** In the north, two major Kurdish parties rule in an enclave protected militarily by the United States and its allies. Several hundred have died in clashes with Iraqi forces since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the south, leaders of a rebellion by Shiite Muslims say that tens of thousands of Shiites have been killed by forces of the Sunni-dominated government since the end of the war.

**AFGHANISTAN** After the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the overthrow of the Soviet-installed leader, Najibullah, last year, the country has collapsed into a civil war involving competing ethnic factions. The Hazars control central and western areas near Iran, the Pathans are largely in control in the east, and the Tajiks largely control the north. Thousands of people are estimated to have been killed recently.

**TAJIKISTAN** Tens of thousands of Tajik Muslims have been driven from their land by resurgent Communist armies seeking to suppress Islamic political power. More than 25,000 people have been killed and 500,000 displaced since 1991.

**KYRGYZSTAN** Continuing tensions between the Kyrgyz and minority Uzbeks have resulted in the recent call by the latter for assimilation with Uzbekistan. About 200 people were killed in the town of Osh in ethnic riots in 1990.

## Africa South of the Sahara

**MAURITANIA** Security forces under the Arab-dominated military government have clashed with opposition groups angry over expulsions and oppression of the black minority population.

**SENEGAL** In Casamance, a coastal region mostly populated by the Diola ethnic group, there is opposition to Muslim domination in the government. Hundreds of people have been killed and thousands have been displaced in clashes with government forces.

**LIBERIA** At least 20,000 have been killed and hundreds of thousands have been uprooted in a civil war. Drawing support from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, the guerrilla leader Charles Taylor controls most of the country. President Samuel Doe, from the Krahn group, was killed in 1990, and Monrovia is held by an interim government installed by an organization of West African nations.

**MALI** A demand for sovereignty by ethnic Tuaregs, who also live in neighboring Niger, has led to fighting in Mali and Niger.

**TOGO** Scores of people were killed last year as government forces loyal to leader General Gnassingbé Eyadéma of the Kabiye ethnic group battled opposition forces, including those from the rival Ewe.

**NIGERIA** The country has many ethnic conflicts, but violence has been the sharpest in fighting between the Hausa, a predominantly Muslim group in the north, and the mostly Christian Yoruba in the south.

**CHAD** President Idriss Déby, who ousted President Hissen Habré in 1990, has faced sporadic rebellions in the west and south. Some have reportedly involved clashes between Déby's Zakawa ethnic group and Habré's Gourane ethnic group.

**DJIBOUTI** Demanding a more prominent role in the government and a multiparty democracy, members of the Afar ethnic group have clashed with the ruling Issa.

**SOMALIA** Clan fighting escalated into full-scale civil war in 1991 and 1992 in which 300,000 people died and 1 million were made homeless from war or starvation. An American-led military force has intervened to establish stability.

**UGANDA** The army, composed principally of members of the Baganda and Banyarwanda ethnic groups, continues to wage sporadic warfare with northern rebels, mainly from the Acholi and Langi.

**RWANDA** Fighting is continuing between the government, dominated by the Hutu people, and a rebel force led by the minority Tutsi, despite a peace agreement in July 1992. Tens of thousands of people have died in ethnic fighting in the last 30 years.

**BURUNDI** Ethnic clashes between the majority ethnic group, the Hutu, and the minority Tutsi, who govern the country, have led to thousands of deaths.

**KENYA** Clashes among various ethnic groups in 1991 and 1992 have reportedly killed 1,000 people and uprooted 50,000 and led to charges that the government of President Daniel arap Moi was fomenting such conflict to discredit moves toward democracy.

**ZAIRE** Thousands of people have died in the last year in a civil war between forces opposing and loyal to President Mobutu Sese Seko; various forces are from competing ethnic groups.

**ANGOLA** Renewed fighting between the government and guerrilla forces led by Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA, has left thousands dead. There is also a violent secessionist movement in the enclave of Cabinda.

**SOUTH AFRICA** Since 1984, about 15,000 people have been killed in political violence related to a black insurrection against the white South African government. About 3,000 were killed in 1992, many in clashes between Zulus and rival black groups.

## Asia

**PAKISTAN** Thousands of people have died in conflicts between government forces and groups of secessionists and dissidents in Sindh province and the Northwest Frontier province.

**INDIA** Tensions between Hindus and Muslims exploded in December when Hindu militants razed a mosque in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh. Rioting

that followed in many places across India led to 2,000 killings by official count, and many more by unofficial estimates. Killings by Muslims and Hindus continue. In Kashmir, 5,000 militants, civilians, and Indian troops have been killed since a rebellion by the largely Muslim population began in 1990. An estimated 120,000 people, mostly Hindus, have fled Kashmir for other parts of India. In Punjab state, about 20,000 Hindus and Sikhs are estimated to have been killed since a rebellion by Sikh militants erupted in 1982. In Assam state, more than 200 have been reported killed as an insurgency by secessionists erupted in 1990. In Nagaland, insurgent Bodos have been fighting for a separate state; about 300 people have been killed.

**BHUTAN** A revolt by ethnic Nepalese against the government and reprisals by government forces have led to thousands of Nepalese fleeing the country in the last 2 years.

**SRI LANKA** An insurgency by mostly Hindu Tamils in the north and east has been carried out against the government, which is dominated by the mostly Buddhist Sinhalese. Since 1983, an estimated 28,000 people have been killed in the Tamil rebellion, and another 50,000 in the government's crackdown on Sinhalese militants.

**BANGLADESH** A migration by members of the country's Muslim majority into the thinly populated Chittagong Hill Tracts region in the south has led to an insurgency by the area's Chakmas, a mainly Buddhist people, leaving hundreds of people dead and tens of thousands displaced.

**MYANMAR** In the last 2 years, more than 250,000 Muslims, charging harassment, have fled across the western border to Bangladesh. Hundreds are also believed to have died in clashes between Burmese soldiers and separatist Karen and other rebels along the Thai-Burmese border in the last 2 years.

**CHINA** Tibetans rebelled against Chinese rule in 1959, with an estimated 87,000 Tibetans killed. After an easing of Chinese rule, Beijing cracked down in 1987. Several dozen people are believed to have been killed in various incidents. In Xinjiang province, the Chinese government suppressed a rebellion among Muslims of Turkic descent in 1990 in which an estimated 50 people died.

**CAMBODIA** Rebel factions signed a peace accord ending a 13-year civil war. A Supreme National Council made up of the rebel factions and the Cambodian

government is to advise the UN, which administers the country's affairs until a new government can be formed after elections this year. Khmer Rouge soldiers, who blame Vietnam for many of the country's problems, have carried out attacks on the 100,000 Vietnamese who live in the country.

**PHILIPPINES** Tens of thousands of people have been killed in fighting between the government and Muslim separatists on the island of Mindanao.

**INDONESIA** A civil war broke out in East Timor in 1975 after Portugal withdrew, and the government crushed the pro-independence rebellion. Human rights groups charge that 100,000 to 200,000 of the 600,000 mostly Roman Catholic East Timorese have died of starvation, disease, or execution since the area was annexed. A separatist movement also exists in northern Sumatra, where Indonesian forces are said by Amnesty International to have killed 2,000 people.

## Latin America

**GUATEMALA** An essentially political conflict between the government and leftist guerrillas has had ethnic overtones because of the long history of repression of Indians. At least 43,000 refugees fled to Mexico, but some are beginning to return.

**COLOMBIA** A group representing rights of Indians, Quintin Lamee, suspended an armed rebellion in 1991, but other Marxist groups claiming to represent peasants are continuing guerrilla attacks on the government.

**PERU** Since 1980, a Maoist guerrilla group known as the Shining Path has waged war and won control of about a third of Peru, drawing support from largely Indian or mixed-race populations. About 26,000 people have been killed in the war and an estimated 600,000 have fled their homes to other parts of the country.

**BRAZIL** Indian tribes in the Amazon region are pressing the government to recognize their traditional homelands. In the northern Amazon state of Roraima, the federal government is campaigning to expel gold miners from the lands of the Yanomami tribes.

**Source:** Portions of this survey are adapted with permission from *The New York Times*, February 7, 1993. Copyright © 1993 The New York Times Company. Additional information is from Morton Halperin and David Scheffer, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992).



"The short-term disorder arising from the collapse of relatively weak states may by the end of the decade lead to a more far-reaching disturbance, with upheavals in states now still grappling with the political control-versus-economic freedom conundrum. Widespread disorder in China, Russia, or the Middle East would make the troubles in Cambodia and Somalia seem bland by comparison."

## Somalia and Other Adventures for the 1990s

BY RONALD K. McMULLEN AND AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

The world needs a new lexicon to catalogue the crises, tragedies, and disasters that are fast becoming the theme of the 1990s. With startling regularity and in every region of the globe, states are imploding. Televised images of Haitian refugees, Somali gunmen, and Bosnian orphans fill the airwaves, while sporadic dispatches from troubled countries as disparate as Cambodia, Tajikistan, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Zaire hint of mayhem yet to be revealed. Meanwhile the major powers, and especially the United States, have reinvested confidence in a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping apparatus that is already stretched thin and is going through doctrinal contortions to meet the novel challenges of the decade.

This instability in the developing world and the former Soviet bloc has replaced the superpower rivalry as the paramount international security dynamic. In January outgoing Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger warned of "a fragmenting world" and "a disintegrating world order." Indeed, the deployment last year of United States troops to Somalia for humanitarian purposes (along with contingents from more than a dozen other countries) may be the prototypical case for the 1990s: state entropy followed by strenuous pressures for international intervention.

### THE END OF THE STATE?

For more than three centuries international politics has been tilted in favor of the state. The UN—fundamentally an organization comprised of states—has been loathe to act without the assent of the member states. But recent actions, such as intervention by the multinational coalition in Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the incursion into Somalia, chip away at the exclusive right of governments to do

what they will within their own borders. At the UN they still genuflect before state sovereignty, but absolute sovereignty is only a legal fiction, and one made even more untenable by the global revolution in communications. Ideas now travel around the globe, literally at the speed of sound and light. Scholars may be taken up with "democracy," "ideology," and "religion," but the idea that seems to be gathering momentum around the world is simply that people deserve a voice in determining their fate. This is not to assert that great posses of "freedom police"—or United States marines, for that matter—are poised to impose the principle. But a government that claims to speak for "the people" increasingly must compete with an assertive citizenry perfectly prepared to speak for itself.

Advances in international telecommunications technologies and information processing facilitate the rapid and relatively unobstructed flow of information both into and out of developing countries. The nearly ubiquitous reach of CNN, the BBC, fax machines, video cameras, and cellular phones ensures that governments cannot keep ideas or information from their people, and also that domestic activities cannot easily be hidden from global scrutiny. Witness the dramatic television footage of the lone Chinese protester facing off against the column of tanks headed toward Tiananmen Square and the nimble use of fax machines as Chinese dissidents overseas kept their countrymen at home informed of international reaction to the events of June 1989. The impact of the successful eastern European democratic revolutions was greatly amplified by technologies that instantaneously transmitted ideas and information about relations between state and society to the peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The demise of the bipolar global system has relegated "strategic" hot spots like Socotra, Laos, Grenada, and Chad to the geographic obscurity from which they came. Other states that might have collapsed during the cold war years were propped up by one or the other

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superpower to keep the rival side from gaining some perceived advantage. Without the Soviet Union to contain, the West is now less interested in maintaining onerous commitments to formerly strategic parts of the third world. Some states will atrophy, simply because they now matter very little in the harsh calculus of geopolitics.

The confluence of structural change in the international system and citizens no longer willing to take it on the chin produces a monumental dilemma for ruling elites in many countries. These global factors affect the ability of regimes in developing states to sustain political legitimacy—that precious authority resting on the shared cultural identity of ruler and ruled.

Political legitimacy entails a judgment by the people that it is just or right for the elite who govern them to do so, and connotes a degree of identity with and obedience to the ideology, institutions, and people who lead the state. In many instances legitimacy must be earned, and big ideas like communism and socialism no longer postpone demands for efficacious governance. Government corruption, incompetence,

and inefficiency corrode popular legitimacy. Rulers under siege, their legitimacy dried up, may still pound round pegs into square holes, hammering their citizens into submission. Nonetheless, repression is not a substitute for legitimacy; it signals the very absence of it. Moreover, repression can be costly in terms of international support. Even a behemoth like China has had to at least pay lip service to human rights. Egregious behavior on the part of the state toward its citizens often undermines access to international loans and credits that are all the more crucial now the cold war spigot has been turned off.

When states collapse, or simply cease to be relevant, individuals may turn to groups based on ethnic,


regional, religious, or family ties to give order and meaning to everyday life. Paradoxically, as the world becomes more high-tech and more homogenous, people cling to their primordial identities and to ideas that stress their distinctiveness; in fact, the onslaught of change is frequently felt as a threat to cultural authenticity. Religion has often been the beneficiary of this quest for authenticity. Obviously religious labels divide people from one another, whether the divisions are within a faith, as between adherents of Orthodoxy and Catholicism in Yugoslavia, or across religious traditions, as with the Christians in Armenia and Muslims in Azerbaijan warring over Nagorno-Karabakh. When people retreat into the sanctuary of familiar social

units, then governments find themselves ruling over fragmented societies in which the realm of justice is often narrow and parochial.

### FLAWED CIVIL SOCIETIES

The deficient, if not the absent, ingredient in many developing states is civil society, that mélange of associations, movements, political parties, and other organizations that allow people peacefully to transcend ties of blood and kinship. In democ-

cratic systems like the United States, civil society is the crucial buffer between the raw power of government and the individual citizen. In authoritarian states, government seeks to dominate, emasculate, or even extinguish an autonomous civil society. Letterhead may be printed, organizational charters announced, and meetings held, but a civil society is as much a state of mind as a structure, and takes years—if not decades or longer—to nurture. This is one of the reasons why when authoritarian regimes fall, the successor regimes erected on the rubble tend to look eerily familiar. Authoritarian rulers may be tottering but authoritarianism is by no means doomed, notwithstanding the ubiquity of the democratic ideal.



Tiananmen 1989: A Picture Worth a Thousand Words

Reuters/Bettmann



Like “Coca-Cola,” the word “democracy” is understood virtually everywhere without translation. But democracy is easier to say than it is to create. The symbol of democracy is the contested election and its secret ballot, but elections mean little where the fundamental ingredient of democracy—civil society—is missing. There is good reason to doubt that democracy can be instilled through the conduct of supervised elections, as the UN is about to attempt in Cambodia. In the absence of civil society, one must be very skeptical about the durability of the results of such balloting, no matter how pristine the procedures.

Civil society has three components—all readily apparent in the United States: *membership* in associations and movements, *civility*, or the willingness to tolerate the disparate political views and memberships of fellow citizens, and *citizenship*. It is precisely the absence of civil society, in all its dimensions, that makes the road to democracy treacherous in many parts of the world.

To sum up, state entropy is increasing with the end of the bipolar world and advances in telecommunications technologies. These two global factors impinge on the ability of some third world states to maintain their political legitimacy and provide effective governance. The following four case studies highlight the interactive effect of these factors in explaining the growing incidence of states tottering on the cusp of disaster.

## SOMALIA SHATTERED

The five-pointed white star on Somalia's flag represents the five regions inhabited by the Somali nation (northern Kenya, Ethiopia's Ogaden region, Djibouti, and northern and southern Somalia) and symbolizes the irredentist objectives of the pan-Somali movement. General Mohammed Siad Barre, after coming to power in a military coup d'état in 1969, fostered militant pan-Somali sentiment as a key legitimizing factor for his regime. He sought to replace his countrymen's ingrained clan loyalty and identity with a nationalist Somali consciousness. In part to help secure his own political base, Siad Barre began mobilizing and centralizing power in Mogadishu at the expense of traditional clan elders and regional centers. His increasing use of Marxist rhetoric coincided with increased military and economic aid from the Soviet Union.

In 1974, Somalia and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which gave the Soviets access to naval and other military facilities at the port of Berbera—located just 200 miles from the straits of Bab al-Mandab and the tip of the Arabian peninsula. In return, Siad Barre was promised heightened economic and military assistance. (By this time aid to Somalia from the Soviet bloc was 400 percent higher than when Siad Barre assumed power.) Emboldened by Soviet support and revolutionary upheaval in neighboring Ethiopia, in July 1977 Somalia launched

the ill-fated Ogaden War to recover another point of the Greater Somali star. Siad Barre even traveled to Moscow a month after the war began, unaware that his patron was about to switch sides.

The pasting the Somalis took at the hands of the Ethiopians and their newfound Soviet and Cuban allies completely undermined Siad Barre's quest for political legitimacy through the idea of a Greater Somalia. The loss of a rich patron meant that rebuilding the country, now swamped with 2 million Ogadeni refugees, would strain his ability to govern well.

Having largely given up on establishing broad-based legitimacy, Siad Barre sought another wealthy benefactor that could supply him with the military and economic resources necessary to establish at least a minimum of effective governance. In 1980, in exchange for increased aid, Somalia agreed to provide the United States with access to port facilities at Berbera and to allow the installation of infrastructure to support the Rapid Deployment Force.

Within a decade, however, the Soviet Union no longer posed a serious threat and the Stalinist Mengistu regime was about to fall in Addis Ababa, leaving the United States with no interest in pulling Siad Barre's chestnuts out of the fire. In January 1991, with rebels of the Hawiye clan's United Somali Congress closing in on the capital and other clan-based rebel movements controlling much of the countryside, Siad Barre fled his palace in a tank, eventually receiving political asylum in Nigeria.

Armed factions held sway throughout the country, and as a two-year drought worsened, armed men began to prey on civilians for sustenance and loot. An estimated 300,000 people died from the effects of drought and the accompanying political chaos and one million Somalis fled to neighboring countries. Gunmen looted everything of value—including all electrical wire in Mogadishu, which was sold for its copper. For all practical purposes Somalia had collapsed.

Last December 9, the world witnessed the bizarre spectacle of the American advance guard in Operation Restore Hope landing near Mogadishu in full combat regalia, only to be met and hounded by the assembled representatives of the international media in a full-blooded feeding frenzy. The UN Security Council had sanctioned this American-led military intervention on December 3 by unanimously adopting Resolution 794, which authorized member states to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” By late January of this year there were over 36,000 foreign troops on the ground in Somalia, including 24,000 Americans and smaller contingents from more than a dozen other countries.

Thus Somalia is a classic example of a state bolstered by the superpower rivalry. When the cold war ended, so too did outside interest in propping up Siad Barre's



tottering regime. And the international humanitarian intervention in Somalia has in part been both instigated and shaped by the international and domestic media. Putting Somalia back together seems a challenge for an anthropologist or a magician, rather than a striped-pants diplomat.

### FULL CIRCLE IN ZAIRE

Following five years of widespread disorder in the former Belgian Congo (1960–1965) and the ill-starred intervention of the UN Congo Force, which included troops from 29 states, by the late 1960s Washington appeared to face the unsavory choice of “Mobutu or chaos.” Earlier worries about Soviet sympathies among former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba’s supporters and various rebels in different regions also prompted the United States to back the authoritarian but anti-Communist regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Thus Zaire would in the 1970s become the largest recipient of American foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights as a key element of relations with Zaire, the American desire to counter Cuban and Soviet influence in neighboring Angola gave Zaire “strategic” status as the cold war raged—a status that the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush made use of by funneling arms through the country to guerrillas battling the Marxist Angolan government.

The democratic revolutions of 1989 in eastern Europe reverberated throughout much of Africa, as people listened to reports by the international media of corrupt one-party systems overturned by peaceful mass action. Perhaps equally influential was the impact on incumbent regimes of the bloody end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania, carried in graphic detail by radio and television across the continent (although some governments attempted, unsuccessfully, to suppress news of the event in the domestic media). A profusion of multiparty systems emerged in Africa in 1989 and 1990. Even Zaire’s single-party system came to an official end, although Mobutu clung to power.

Mobutu, who had systematically purged all potential rivals for two decades and beaten down all attempts at creating an autonomous civil society, sought to retain a role for himself somewhere, as he put it, between that of the lord of a private hunting preserve and a figurehead who reigns but does not rule. Last December, as two years of deliberations by the National Salvation Conference drew to a close in Kinshasa, Mobutu remained sequestered in his fortresslike palace in his home region in northern Zaire. This January the High Council of the Republic, viewing itself as the legitimate parliament during the transition to multiparty democracy and the successor to the National Salvation Conference, went toe to toe with President Mobutu over the issue of who had the power to make key government decisions regarding, for

example, running the civil service and printing money. Widespread rioting by unpaid soldiers added to the disorder in January and February, as expatriates fled the country.

By early February the United States and other countries in the West saw that “Mobutu or chaos” had become “Mobutu and chaos.” With communism no longer seen as a threat in Africa, and the former Marxists in Angola transformed into democrats, the United States no longer needed Mobutu as an anti-Communist bulwark. In an extraordinary measure, on February 3, 1993, France, Belgium, and the United States asked Mobutu to defer to the government of Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi. Mobutu remained—at least temporarily—unmoved. Having destroyed all elements of civil society and having all but devastated the country’s modest physical infrastructure, Mobutu’s chimera of legitimacy rested on his control of the national media networks. “Effective governance” (that is, keeping Mobutu in power) was accomplished primarily by the 10,000-man presidential guard and a handful of loyal regional governors.

It was chaos and the impending disintegration of the country that triggered the massive UN intervention in the 1960s, a bloody venture that haunted and circumscribed UN operations for years afterward. More than 30 years later, the situation in Zaire seems to have come full circle. Will the UN be able and willing to respond again?

### THE TRIAL IN CAMBODIA

The UN has committed itself to the investment of great political and psychological capital in Cambodia. Decimated by decades of genocidal civil war and outside intervention, Cambodia virtually ceded its sovereignty to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1991. Led by Yasushi Akashi of Japan, the 22,000-man organization is to help create “a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections.” Scheduled for late May, the elections may be the first step toward reestablishing effective governance in this dysfunctional state.

UNTAC is the UN’s most ambitious operation to date, and with expenses approaching \$2 billion, one of the most expensive. Its success or failure will be critical in shaping how the UN views commitments of this sort in the future.

The end of the bipolar system and recent developments in telecommunications have had less to do with the collapse of Cambodia (which was already in an advanced state of entropy by 1989) than with the international response to it. Many of the major world actors contributed to the tragic political history of modern Cambodia, including French colonialism, Japanese occupation, American support for the military government of Lon Nol, Chinese backing of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, and Soviet assistance

(by way of Vietnam) to the puppet government under Hun Sen. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant a drastic reduction in foreign assistance to Vietnam and therefore in Hanoi's ability to prop up Hun Sen and his colleagues in Phnom Penh. The politically motivated killing of several hundred thousand Cambodians (the conservative estimate) by the Khmer Rouge regime that ruled the country from 1975 to 1978 aroused nearly global condemnation as media sources revealed the extent of the horror in Cambodia.

Despite heroic efforts by UNTAC and general international good will, events do not augur well for a timely return to effective governance. As of late February the Khmer Rouge maintained it would boycott the May general elections. Troops loyal to Hun Sen have attacked Khmer Rouge positions in the western part of the country as well as supporters of Funcinpec, the political party composed of partisans of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Khmer Rouge members reportedly have massacred ethnic Vietnamese in several recent attacks in north-central Cambodia, and the level of public trust—crucial to the UNTAC process—appears to be on the wane. Prince Sihanouk, a mercurial septuagenarian who has recently suffered a stroke, is the most popular man in the country and is likely to be elected to the presidency should he run.

Some observers fear that elections without the Khmer Rouge would be pointless, unless perhaps the group is co-opted or pressured into a post-election coalition of some type. Even if the Khmer Rouge decides to participate, it apparently retains the military clout to resume the civil war if dissatisfied with the outcome of the balloting. Previous tacit Thai acquiescence and covert Chinese backing of the Khmer Rouge—both aimed at weakening Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina—may fuel Khmer Rouge intransigence. Regional Chinese-Thai-Vietnamese political rivalries may thus end up undermining this most ambitious of UN peacekeeping operations despite the best intentions of the international community.

## **AFGHANISTAN UNRAVELING**

For much of the past 150 years Afghanistan's *raison d'être* has been to serve as a strategic buffer in the Great Game played out in Central Asia between the British Raj and Imperial Russia. As the Great Game gave way to the cold war, Afghanistan's role remained basically unchanged. Domestically, the central government exercised little direct influence beyond Kabul's suburbs, while Pushtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek peoples led their fiercely independent, traditional lives in rural areas.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Western analysts saw it as a manifestation of the relentless Russian/Soviet drive toward the warm-water ports of Baluchistan and nefarious Soviet designs on Iran and Pakistan. We now know, from released Soviet files, that the invasion was more an ad hoc response to

pleas for assistance by the Marxist regime in Kabul than the unfolding of any grand strategy. The ensuing decade of war between various Soviet-backed governments and Afghan guerrillas (*mujahideen*) led to the death or maiming of perhaps 1 million Afghans and the exile of a quarter of the country's population to Iran or Pakistan.

During the war the United States covertly provided over \$1-billion worth of aid to the Afghan rebels. Americans caught fleeting glimpses of the fighting on television as CBS News anchor Dan Rather and lesser lights of the Western media establishment reported from inside the war-torn land. United States aid to the rebels ranged from sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to mules used to transport matériel across the rugged Hindu Kush. American cold warriors heralded the 1989 Soviet withdrawal as a clear victory and a reaffirmation of the so-called Reagan Doctrine of "rolling back" Communist gains in the third world.

Afghanistan, however, was utterly ravaged. Villages had been obliterated, orchards cut down, fields littered with land mines, bridges blown up, and thousand-year-old irrigation systems destroyed. Physical devastation in itself, however, must not be equated with the collapse of the state in Afghanistan. In April 1992, the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime fell and the state simply collapsed. But the tenuous unity of the victors collapsed as well, and the government simply ceased to function.

Last March a powerful, pro-government northern warlord, former Afghan army General Abdul Rashid Dostum, defected with his 40,000-man Uzbek militia to the rebel cause. Dostum, fighting alongside the Tajik guerrilla leader Ahmad Masoud, made spectacular gains against the crumbling Najibullah forces in northern Afghanistan. Aided by several ethnic Pushtun guerrilla groups based in Pakistan, this disparate coalition established itself in Kabul in April. Burhanuddin Rabbani was chosen to head the interim government, but Islamic fundamentalist *mujahideen* under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar objected, and sought to unseat the Rabbani coalition by force. By August Kabul was the scene of a full-scale war that continues, with Hekmatyar's forces still raining rockets on the capital.

Afghanistan's dichotomous Communist-*mujahideen* political cleavage of the past 15 years has given way to a tangle of armed factions based on ethnonationalism, regionalism, religion, and political ideology, all leavened by an unhealthy dose of personal greed and political ambition. Effective and legitimate government is unlikely to return to this long-suffering state anytime soon.

## **HARDLY CONCLUDED**

International reaction to instances of state entropy has been mixed. We have examined cases in which the

UN virtually administers an atrophied state (Cambodia) and authorized but did not command multilateral intervention (Somalia); the subject of a once (and future?) UN-commanded intervention (Zaire); and a collapsed state in which nobody seems willing or able to intervene (Afghanistan).

The UN's financial and political capability to intervene in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions may be at their high-water mark. Growing responsibilities in the Balkans and Africa, coinciding with reverses in Angola and signs of trouble in Cambodia, may soon limit the organization's eagerness and ability to take on new challenges in atrophied states. "Europe," utilizing the European Community or Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe mechanisms, has thus far proved unable to take the lead in regional—let alone global—instances of state collapse. Likewise, the Commonwealth of Independent States has been only marginally successful in dampening the rising disorder in the former Soviet Union.

American unilateral intervention could conceivably occur in response to state collapse in the Caribbean (Cuba) or the Middle East, but seems highly unlikely elsewhere. In his farewell address at West Point in January, President Bush laid out the following five conditions under which United States military intervention might be justified:

- where the stakes warrant;
- where and when force can be effective;
- where no other policies are likely to prove effective;
- where its application can be limited in scope and time; and
- where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.

Excluding small-scale rescue and evacuation missions, very few cases of state collapse meet these criteria for American military intervention. The French, perhaps alone among other major powers, retain a willingness and capability to intervene unilaterally, particularly in the francophone world.

Liberia is the setting for an interesting alternative to UN or great power intervention in a collapsed state. Under the auspices of the West African economic organization ECOWAS, Nigeria has cobbled together a fairly credible regional effort to restore order in Liberia, which collapsed under the weight of the ethnic-based rebellion of Charles Taylor and the corruption and repression of the military government of Samuel Doe. Although most regional organizations have less experience in intervention than the UN or the United States, an overcommitted UN system and inward-looking

America may in coming years propel regional and subregional organizations into the role of peacemakers of last resort.

The current alarming rate of state collapse and disintegration may be a temporary phenomenon stemming from a pent-up supply of atrophying states after four decades of artificial preservation by the enforced status quo of the cold war. Just as the Dark Ages followed the fall of the Roman Empire, so too one must expect a certain amount of disorder following momentous changes in the patterns of global politics.

If this argument is correct, likely candidates for collapse will be weak states (for example, Somalia) unable to survive on their own in the new international environment. The UN's 1992 *Human Development Report* lists 38 states classified as "low achievers" on the basis of changes in their Human Development Index since 1970. A majority of these are in sub-Saharan Africa, but the list includes seven countries in Latin America and seven in Asia.

A second group of states may face rising disorder and potential collapse in the coming decade for a slightly different but related set of interactions between global factors and the domestic quest for political legitimacy and effective governance. This group comprises those states that seek to limit autonomous political participation but face the imperative to open or liberalize their economic systems.

This inherent conflict between political control and economic freedom is exacerbated by the need for a free flow of information and ideas in a modern, market-oriented economy and recent advances in telecommunications. An import-export firm needs a fax machine or international telephone link to be competitive in the world marketplace, yet fax machines can receive political tracts as well as market orders. Gorbachev's Soviet Union, which clearly flunked the political control/economic freedom challenge, disintegrated. China, which has approached the dilemma by allowing market initiatives but maintaining political control, may or may not be more successful.

In conclusion, we need to face squarely the growing incidence of disorder in the world. International and unilateral structures and capabilities for responding to state collapse and/or disintegration need to be developed. Most important, policymakers will have to focus on the inevitable political choice of how and when to live with disorder, and how and when to intervene. The short-term disorder arising from the collapse of relatively weak states may by the end of the decade lead to a more far-reaching disturbance, with upheavals in states now still grappling with the political control-versus-economic freedom conundrum. Widespread disorder in China, Russia, or the Middle East would make the troubles in Cambodia and Somalia seem bland by comparison. ■



"The collapse of international communism has led not only to the Western presumption of 'marketplace magic' but also to the spread around the globe of... what has been termed liberal triumphalism. [T]he third world has never found market-led development to be the panacea its newly converted adherents hope for, [and while] the notion of democracy holds much greater appeal" its aura may mask a multitude of deeper problems.

## The South Looks North: The Third World in the New World Order

BY DEEPA OLLAPALLY

The end of the cold war has produced an anomalous situation for the world's developing countries. Although superpower competition was played out most often and most virulently in the developing world, the West's euphoria over the collapse of Soviet power has not been matched in third world nations.<sup>1</sup> While the implications of the new international system clearly are not uniform among the developing countries, there is reason to be skeptical about third world prospects generally.

Such skepticism is found among third world leaders as diverse as Robert Mugabe of socialist Zimbabwe and Malaysia's Mohamad Mahathir, who has steered his country's economy with capitalist strategies for growth. What these two had to say at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Caracas on November 27, 1991, is instructive. Mahathir declared, "Lamentably these changes do not augur well for the countries of the developing South. . . . Indeed, the new unipolar world is fraught with dangers of a return to the old dominance of the powerful over the weak. . . . A new world order is propounded seemingly to legitimize interference in the affairs of independent nations. . . ."

At the same meeting, Mugabe charged—as his colleagues have long been contending in one form or another, especially since the 1974 United Nations-based demand for a New International Economic Order—"The current. . . order continues to accentuate poverty in the developing countries. . . . Developed

countries are continually manipulating international systems to their benefit yet purporting to be democratic." These comments raise the question whether the former axis of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is being replaced by the North-South divide between rich and poor countries.

The thinking in the North—particularly the United States—increasingly locates security threats in the third world. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in a 1991 report that "major portions of the world lag in the continuing struggle to improve the human condition. This lag, coupled with heightened expectations born of the ever-widening span of knowledge of progress in other areas of the world, are giving rise to insurgencies, terrorism, drug trafficking, and nationalist fervor." This reorientation in the developed world's perception of where danger might lie is bound to cause concern in third world capitals, since the players involved are so unequal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff report alludes to the link between instability and dire economic conditions—a connection third world analysts are accustomed to treating as a foregone conclusion. Thus an important issue for this era after the cold war will be whether the conditions of underdevelopment can be overcome.

### INTO THE FIRE?


From the South's perspective, the new international environment does not necessarily portend more favorable prospects for their primary concern: improving material conditions at home. Now as during the cold war, the third world is in a generally weak position in the international political economy; change at that level has been lacking, amid the other momentous shifts of a world in transition.

One key problem is that the developing countries' growing need for aid is being met with "aid fatigue" in the North. Without superpower competition, what was

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<sup>1</sup>Although the term "third world" may be questioned, it retains conceptual meaning and is used interchangeably with "developing countries" in this article.



under cold war logic the most compelling reason for the advanced industrial nations to assist developing countries has evaporated. Indeed, in its place has arisen a plethora of new demands from the erstwhile second world for aid and investment capital. Given the political importance of keeping these former Communist states on the path toward liberalization and preventing backsliding, the West has pledged financial help and will almost certainly provide more, diverting resources that might have gone to the South. So after remaining essentially stagnant during the 1980s, official development assistance to the third world dropped 2 percent in 1989 from the year before, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and continued to decline in 1990.

Simultaneously, the political economies of the developed countries appear to be turning inward, which at the very least leads to benign neglect of international needs and at worst could spell economic nationalism. The trend emerged in the late 1970s, when Northern countries, having decided that fighting inflation was their number one economic priority, proceeded to introduce recessionary macroeconomic policy that relied heavily on monetary instruments. This resulted in a significant slowdown in the North and a downturn in demand for Southern commodities—a downturn not seen since the 1930s; at the same time, interest rates rose to unprecedented heights, with the untenable consequence that developing countries paid more and

more to service their foreign debt while receiving less and less for their exports. In effect, the third world has ended up absorbing a good part of the costs of the North's attempt to curb inflation.

Although the recovery in the developed economies began in 1983, compared to past recoveries this one has been singularly unimpressive. The critical point for the South is that there has been no noticeable improvement in external economic conditions for most of the developing countries. The debt crises that began with Mexico in 1982 triggered a sharp reduction in international lending by commercial banks so that repayments of principal and interest charges exceeded loans from 1983 onward; thus the usual North-to-South debt-related financial flows were reversed. Direct foreign investment also fell dramatically in real terms in the early 1980s, and while it picked up by 1986, most of the benefits were concentrated in the newly industrializing countries of Asia. Indeed, the 1980s has come to be regarded as a "lost decade" for development. While internal factors contributed to the development crises in many third world countries, it is impossible to discount the impact of the inhospitable broader economic environment.

The situation has persisted into the 1990s. With the failure of the Communist experiment in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, the virtues of the market model have been accepted as fact with renewed vigor in Western policy circles, as well as at the World Bank

and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whether the lessons drawn from what was the second world may be extrapolated is not at all clear; as opposed to eastern Europe's experience, for most developing countries it has been their association with capitalism that has failed to produce growth and development.

The newly industrializing nations of Asia, whose economic success is by now legendary, are the one group in the third world exempt from the generally dismal picture. But in practically all cases, government intervention in the economy in one form or other was pervasive; pure market principles were not adhered to. Almost all the countries were under authoritarian regimes with repressive social policies, especially when it came to labor. And these Asian states were lucky because at the critical stage of their export-led strategy the international economic climate was highly receptive, unlike at present.

### THE NEW PROTECTIONISM

From the point of view of aspiring industrializers, post-cold war conditions have, if anything, worsened their prospects. The growing protectionism in the West has tended to be directed against items of special importance to the South, such as textiles, petrochemicals, steel, processed agricultural products, automotive parts, and electronics. The so-called "new protectionism" based on nontariff barriers such as voluntary export restraints and "orderly marketing arrangements" has had the pernicious effect of blocking entry to the market for even the most efficient producers.

There is no evidence that this trend will be reversed. The United States is confronted by an increasing number of domestic constituencies demanding protection from international competition, and this is clearly eroding earlier government commitment to global integration and free trade. As the cold war recedes, critics from across the political spectrum argue against keeping markets open for erstwhile allies and partners practicing protectionism in the name of a defunct pact against communism. Taiwan and South Korea reaped enormous benefits thanks to their strategic importance, with the United States tolerating their restrictive market practices, but developing countries today cannot count on anything similar.

The high point for the third world's ability to get the developed countries to move toward concessions, symbolized by the New International Economic Order, is not likely to be reached again. The much touted Global Negotiations at the UN, which were supposed to have done so much for North-South relations in the 1980s, were derailed by the debt crisis and the domestic economic climate in the North. The ongoing Uruguay Round of trade talks under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) auspices that began in 1986 would have been an appropriate venue for a

revival of the flagging North-South dialogue, but have served only to underscore the differences between the two sides on trade matters; if anything, the North, led by the United States, has hardened its position as the round has progressed.

One fundamental area of disagreement is intellectual property rights, which has brought what may be termed the most "assertive industrializers," including Brazil and India, into the fray. Third world countries tend to have much less restrictive patent protection than the developed countries, and sometimes none at all; significantly, patents are granted for processes rather than products. This more permissive approach is geared toward encouraging technological gains and adaptations that developing countries believe essential if they are to overcome their technology deficit. The South sees the North's efforts to construct a more restrictive system as simply increasing the monopolistic power of the multinationals.

Another emerging point of contention is America's insistence on including services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications in GATT negotiations. Doing this would open these sectors in the developing world to highly competitive American corporations, with huge benefits for them. Again, the developing world, led by the assertive industrializers, is resisting, since this is certain to stymie growth in nascent service sectors as well as invite foreign control over key parts of the national economy.

Responding to its deteriorating global position, the United States has designed new mechanisms to shore up its economy. Provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act specifically empower the executive to retaliate against countries deemed to have "unfairly" discouraged American exports. By 1990 more than half the 32 cases being investigated under the provisions involved developing countries. Two of those singled out as the "worst violators" were Brazil and India—as coincidence would have it, the leading spokesmen for the third world at the Uruguay Round.

The drive by the advanced industrial nations to maintain and even improve their economic status relative to the developing world is crystallizing in the formation of regional trade blocs, exemplified by moves in the European Community, by the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in Japan's evolving ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As cold war alliance politics disappears and economic competition among the first world countries gives rise to the tactics of bloc politics, the impact on the developing world is mixed. African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries will have a more difficult time insinuating themselves into these schemes. And as for those third world nations in the blocs, one wonders whether they will continue to serve as the weak periphery—providing, for example, cheap labor



and a poorly protected environment that richer countries can pollute. On the whole, the economic sovereignty of developing countries may be more fragile now than under the "old world order."

## EXPORTING DEMOCRACY

The collapse of international communism has led not only to the Western presumption of "marketplace magic" but also to the spread around the globe of its liberal democratic ideology, or what has been termed liberal triumphalism. While the third world has never found market-led development to be the panacea its newly converted adherents hope for, the notion of democracy holds much greater appeal. The example of eastern Europe clearly reveals the importance of participation and the likelihood of political decay if public confidence is not maintained. But United States actions in the developing world after the cold war suggest that a wide gap looms between the reality and the rhetoric. Selective support of the drive toward democracy still seems to be the norm.

Haiti is a good case in point. The military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide—the charismatic priest elected in 1990 in the country's first fully free democratic elections after 29 years of despotic rule by the Duvalier family—has been met with tentative countermeasures such as a poorly enforced embargo by the Organization of American States and half-hearted moves to put together a multinational monitoring mission. The United States, which wields tremendous clout in the OAS and Haiti, bears special responsibility for the ineffective response. Pressured by American investors with holdings in Haiti, the administration of President George Bush failed to invoke the full range of sanctions available to it, and then diluted the sanctions it did put in place; for example, less than three months after the coup it exempted American corporations with Haitian assembly plants from the embargo. The reluctance to take more forceful action to restore democracy in Haiti stems in large part from an antipathy to Aristide's controversial populist and left-leaning politics.<sup>2</sup> United States policies after the cold war have changed far less than one might have imagined and suggests that the trade-off between narrow interests and the broader objective of spreading democracy will be settled in favor of the former. Even the more liberal Clinton administration took a hard line on refugees fleeing Haiti, although many of these people rightly feared political persecution at home.

Just how committed are the United States and other Western powers to democracy in the developing world? As it stands, even when democracy is promoted, the West tends to equate it with parliamentary elections

and multiparty politics. But the formal mechanisms of democracy can easily mask the social and economic inequalities that are characteristic of most third world societies and that thwart genuine popular representation. What these developing countries require is the creation of preconditions for genuine democracy, such as more equal income distribution, improved literacy rates, land reform, and access to information. These, however, are precisely the measures likely to trigger opposition from elites, which in turn could lead to popular revolt. Thus the path to true democracy in the South is likely to be tumultuous at best and tortuous at worst because of the threat democratization represents for entrenched elites who, during the cold war years, rested secure in the knowledge that their respective foreign patrons would stand by them. While the former Soviet Union has shed its third world associates wholesale, leaving them to their own devices, the United States has not shown similar dispatch in reversing its policies toward authoritarian regimes.

What the United States, along with the IMF, has been pushing developing countries toward with renewed vigor is liberalization and privatization schemes. Liberalization, which is often part of an overall IMF "austerity" program, invariably exacts painful social costs in poor countries. In a freewheeling democracy, such costs cannot be expected to go unchallenged, and the challenges would imperil American and other Western interests; indeed, from the West's point of view, greater and not less social control would then be necessary. But this would contradict declared policy on democracy. Thus for the North the choice is between fostering forces of genuine democracy and supporting peaceful transitions in the third world, or facing violent social upheavals that would be politically embarrassing and potentially dangerous for Northern interests, as well as disastrous for the countries involved.

Insistence on replicating Western liberal democratic conceptions of political economy and ideology in the developing world is likely to be counterproductive. It is becoming increasingly clear that exported Western ideology, whether of the socialist or capitalist variety, has not provided definitive answers for the South. Indeed, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Algerian upheavals of 1991 stand as vivid testimony to the perception that both capitalism and socialism failed in their mission to deliver material goods. The turn toward Islamic revivalism, in this context, may best be interpreted as a search for a more domestically authentic vision that transcends the twin ideologies of the cold war.

Thus, along with its ongoing crisis of development, the South is also now experiencing what may be called a crisis of vision. And the vision of a new world order as put into practice thus far by the United States does not appear decisively different from a unilateral project to

<sup>2</sup>A good discussion can be found in Pamela Constable, "Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 89 (Winter 1992–1993).

secure American interests in a more complex and variegated international environment.

## HOW COLLECTIVE IS COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

A key aspect of the new world order is collective security and respect for international law. This is clearly welcome by the weaker countries, since they stand to gain most when rules rather than force govern international relations. Collective security also implies more democratic decision making in the management of conflicts, with a shift away from the capitals of powerful countries and toward multilateral institutions such as the UN.

But if the first post-cold war conflict is any guide to the shape of the new order, serious questions must be raised regarding the UN's ability to go beyond the interests of its dominant members. Even the organization's generally cautious former secretary general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, has suggested the UN was misused by the United States in its prosecution of the Persian Gulf War.<sup>3</sup> What became apparent in the shaping of the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the UN's general willingness to accommodate United States objectives without any real debate. Under American pressure and shrewd carrot-and-stick diplomacy, more independent-minded countries such as China and France, succumbed. Belying the more peaceful vision for the world after the cold war put forward by President Bush, the United States wasted a tremendous opportunity to use creative diplomacy and economic sanctions prescribed by the UN charter rather than resorting to war. Another casualty of the war has been the brief hopes of developing countries that a "global peace dividend" resulting from the ending of the cold war might be used for development purposes.

The Gulf War also underscored the ineffectiveness of the nonaligned movement, which had already been sapped by the collapse of the second world. The group was an inconsequential player in the Persian Gulf crisis, making only feeble attempts to resolve hostilities short of war. The traditional pillars of nonalignment found themselves hardly up to the task, what with India and Yugoslavia immersed in their internal problems and Egypt and Iraq on opposite sides. Thus nonalignment's political import as a "third force" in the bipolar world is unlikely to be reproduced in the

new order—and an important means for expressing the interests of developing countries will be eroded.

The new era promised improvement in the resolution of regional conflicts that had been stoked by superpower competition. It was expected that the United States and the former Soviet Union would jointly hammer out compromise solutions that warring parties could abide by. In actuality, the Russians have opted out of these third world conflicts entirely, leaving a single peace broker. And historical loyalties or enmities toward local actors place limits on United States-sponsored conflict resolution. In Angola, where internal conflict was exacerbated by superpower rivalry for 16 years, the post-cold war settlement found the United States continuing to aid the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), its favored faction in the three-way nationalist struggle, right up to the May 1991 peace agreement between the government and UNITA. The United States also has shown little interest in ensuring that peace processes, once started, go forward. Again in Angola, the Bush administration agreed to a meager \$14.5 million in aid for the transition to democracy, including the demobilization of government and UNITA military forces, even though it had managed to allocate an estimated \$75 million annually to UNITA in the final years before the cease-fire. In Afghanistan, another casualty of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union were eager to disengage, without leaving behind any stable political structure. The central message for countries that, wittingly or unwittingly, served as proxies for superpower conflict seems to be that the remaining superpower has little if any obligation toward them.

Unlike the Western world, the developing world would seem to have little to celebrate with the ending of the cold war. Whether in the areas of political economy, security, or ideology, the space on the global agenda for third world concerns has shrunk. The developing countries' bargaining power and leverage, never great, have steadily eroded since the onset of the debt crises in the early 1980s. With the cold war over, developing countries matter even less for the North.

But with three-quarters of humankind living in the third world and the gap between rich countries and poor continuing to widen, the potential for instability in the international system—ranging from the movement of refugees to the North to social upheavals in the South—is high. Unless the West is fully cognizant of such pressures and the need to address them, the benefits that were expected to come from the more beneficent climate of the post-cold war period are likely to be short-lived for all. ■

<sup>3</sup>Clovis Maksoud, former ambassador from the Arab League to the UN, provides an insider's account in "The Arab World's Quandary," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Summer 1991).

"We have never learned, or we have forgotten, that the environment is the basis for all life and for all production. Rather than being an interest competing with other interests for attention, it is in reality the playing field on which all interests compete."

## Sustainable Development: What Is It and How Do We Get There?

BY STEPHEN VIEDERMAN

If we don't change direction, we are going to end up where we are headed." Our current course is not sustainable, given that our concern is, and must be, for the welfare of present and future generations.

We begin with six signs of unsustainability. These are issues from which the countries of the world cannot hide or insulate themselves:

- Humans and their economic activities consume 40 percent of the productivity of plant material created each year by photosynthesis. The rate of increase in human use is about 2 percent per year, meaning a doubling in 35 years. Since humans are but one of between 5 million and 30 million species on earth that make use of these materials, this would appear to be ecologically impossible. As World Bank ecologist Robert Goodland suggests, we will have to say "enough" soon.
- Global warming is increasingly being accepted as a fact by all.
- Recent data on ozone depletion over temperate zones are raising new concern about the magnitude of the problem.
- Land degradation is proceeding at alarming rates. Thirty-five percent of the earth's land is already degraded, and this damage is largely irreversible in a human time scale. Soil loss outpaces soil formation by at least a power of ten; in the United States soil erosion rates are estimated at 7.1 tons per acre

annually, which is 14 times faster than the formation of soil.

- Loss of biodiversity is reflected in the decline of the world's richest habitat—tropical forests, 55 percent of which have already been destroyed. Some 5,000 species become extinct every year, a rate 10,000 times higher than in pre-human days.
- The number of poor in the world continues to grow despite extensive official assistance efforts and a quintupling of the global economy's output since 1950. Even in the wealthy, market-oriented industrial economies of the North, 100 million people still live in poverty.

### THE PATH TO RUIN

How did we get here? Clearly, there are no simple explanations, but a number of factors come into play.

We have consistently failed to recognize that the economic system is an open system in a closed and finite ecosystem. The economic system is not a closed one, as most economists would have us believe. Failure to recognize this may have derived from the fact that until recently the scale of the economic system was relatively small compared to the ecosystem; thus we were less aware of its impact. Furthermore, much of our attention was focused on resource constraints, such as oil depletion, which are more, though not totally, susceptible to substitution and technological innovation. What we are observing more and more today, however, are the problems associated with the disposal of the wastes of our life-style in the North. There simply are no benign places, or sinks, for our wastes to go, as global warming and ozone depletion dramatically confirm. The repositories of our common wastes are largely held in common—air, water, and to a lesser degree, land. As a result, their overuse is less correctable by so-called automatic market mechanisms.

We have never learned, or we have forgotten, that

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the environment is the basis for all life and for all production. Rather than being an interest competing with other interests for attention, it is in reality the playing field on which all interests compete. As a result of our narrow point of view we disdain nature and nature's forces. University of Southern California historian Kevin Starr reflected after the fire that swept through the hills of Oakland, California, in October 1991: "There are limits to what can be done with California. We have a new kind of environmental limit, not so much having to do with damage to the environment, but [with] how much population is sustainable in the environmental engineering formula. If you over-engineer, there are all kinds of side products. California is not a nice place. It is very dangerous."

Also, we have for too long had an uncritical love affair with technology, although today's problems are all too often yesterday's solutions. Led by scientists and engineers, we have believed there is nothing we cannot do. Yet as the essayist Jerry Mander observed in his recent book, *In the Absence of the Sacred*, "All new technologies are introduced in terms of their utopian possibilities. The downside of the story is left for a later generation to discern and experience, when the technology is much more difficult to dismantle."

Our belief in technology has allowed us to continue to avoid making a distinction between growth—quantitative change—and development—qualitative change—and has allowed us to assume that there are no limits. "Of course, growth will end some day," agrees economist Robert Fri, president of Resources for the Future, "but this conclusion is only a troubling curiosity if technology gives us ample time before the limits are reached." Yet "sustainable growth" is an oxymoron. Growth cannot, by definition, continue in a closed system. Sustained growth in the human body is cancer—and is feared. Yet economic growth has been revered, sought after as a panacea without considering its consequences, especially for nature as a resource and as a receptacle for our wastes.

We have assumed and continue to assume that growth will lead to equity and justice within and among countries, regardless of the political or economic system. But the supporting evidence is hard to find. "Trickle-down" has been of limited success. Economic growth may be necessary for a period of time in certain parts of the world to improve the living standards of the poor. But it will have to be a different kind of growth, targeted to the needs of people, and sensitive to the needs of the environment. We have maintained our faith in the market system's ability to deal with issues of the public good, including ecological sustainability and justice. Yet in its failure to value nature's capital as well as human health, the market system fails to deal adequately with that which we seek to protect and create.

Furthermore, we as a people, and the economic

system that has been defined, have failed to consider our obligations to future generations, which must be at the core of any conceptualization of a sustainable world. The economists' discount rates apply at best to a single generation. And the short attention span of American business and industry leads to the use of nature's capital—among other things—without regard for tomorrow.

## A SUSTAINABLE VISION

What are the ecological principles on which a sustainable society can be built? These are adapted from a 1990 statement developed at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City for the Episcopal Church of the United States.

1. Nature will be a source of knowledge, a model to emulate, and a mentor to teach us proper approaches to solving our problems. Ecologist John Todd's "living machines" are exemplars of this. He uses sunlight or plants, bacteria, and aquatic animals to treat wastewater and sludge, obviating the need for damaging chemicals.

2. Issues of environmental deterioration, oppression, and violence will be linked in analysis and action. Gender and racial oppression and efforts to dominate nature will be seen as having a common root. There will also be recognition that all manifestations of violence—child and spouse abuse, war, disregard for the environment—are at the core the same. Environmental justice will be a fundamental concern, as was eloquently stated at the First National Peoples of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held in Washington in October 1991.

3. Humility will guide our actions. We will act with the restraint that befits good stewards. We will, for example, question whether we are capable, in the words of *Scientific American*, of "Managing the Planet" when, as Oberlin College environmentalist David Orr has suggested, "we have enough trouble managing the back 40!"

4. We will consider "right scale." Place and locality will be seen as the foundation for all durable economies, and for the beginning of action to deal with our problems. When the scale is appropriate, we gain confidence to move ahead because we are more sure that our knowledge is adequate to the task. As Massachusetts Commissioner of Agriculture Greg Watson has observed, "we come back to scale as the most powerful method for dealing with the tendency not to want to practice restraint."

5. Sufficiency will replace economic efficiency. The finiteness of the earth calls on us to recognize

"enoughness." We will learn to live within our means. According to World Bank economist Herman Daly, this demands that we use renewable resources at rates that do not exceed their capacity to renew themselves; use nonrenewable resources at rates that do not exceed our capacity to substitute for them; and use no resources at rates that exceed the capacity of the natural world to assimilate or process the wastes associated with their use.

6. Community will be seen as essential for survival. This will require a new vision of citizenship and accountability at all levels. The concept of a "global community" has its appeal. But it must be a community of communities, reflecting and encouraging diversity.

7. Diversity—both biological and cultural—will be preserved and defended. As in nature, a polyculture has strengths not seen in monocultures. Diversity will be an index of human and environmental health, a measure of resiliency, and will provide a margin of safety from unanticipated assaults.

### SOME REVOLUTIONARY GOALS

With this as background, what will be the characteristics of a sustainable society?

Economic goals will include:

- employment creation
- equitable income distribution within countries and redistribution among countries
- the establishment of an equilibrium between the economy and other human and nonhuman systems
- technology exchange, not simply technology transfer
- economic self-reliance at the community and national level

Social and cultural goals will include:

- equity and justice, emphasizing needs over wants, especially in the North
- full status as participants in the polity for all regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, or class
- maintenance of cultural diversity, including respect and support for indigenous peoples
- strengthened communities through the participation of individuals and social groups in the

conduct of their own affairs; everyone will be represented at the table

- revitalization of sustainable rural communities through the development of environmentally sensitive and economically productive agriculture, family farming, and appropriate value-added environmentally sound industrial development
- revitalization of communities within urban settings

Political goals will include:

- political security, calling on the participation of communities in defining the problems of the polity and developing solutions, so as to protect from nondemocratic internal threats and to meet the needs of the inhabitants
- strategic security, so that communities are able to defend themselves against external threats, coercion, or invasion, whether economic or political
- environmental security, under which a viable balance is struck between a community's population and the demands made on it relative to its economic endowment (including its natural capital and its levels of technology) and performance, and which allows it to protect itself from environmental assaults from outside the community
- a world that is largely demilitarized

Ecological goals will include:

- planning for ecological stability that will fit with increased general self-reliance and rely much more on renewable and recyclable supplies of resources
- environmental protection through greater concentration on resource and waste repository constraints, which may require resource planning and target setting to minimize the use of resources and the production of wastes
- technology assessment, management, and regulation, with particular attention to unintended consequences in the medium to long term
- focusing first on waste reduction and then on waste management
- zero toxins—which, while it may not be a fully attainable goal in a modern society, represents a more appropriate one than "acceptable risk"

- balancing ecological debt within and among countries
- maintaining biodiversity
- sufficiency rather than simple efficiency, since high levels of consumption are generally incompatible with the conservation and preservation of the world's resources
- population stabilization

Unfortunately, the environmental movement in the United States has been centered mainly around ecological issues, and less around economic, sociocultural, and political goals. Its approach has tended to be linear and narrowly focused rather than systemic and structural. As reflected by its participation in the June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the so-called "Earth Summit", the American environmental movement has not been sufficiently involved in the broader development debate on matters such as poverty and equity.

### MOVING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY

A sustainability movement must begin to take shape. This will be distinct from the environmental movement from which it will grow, and much broader in its orientation. It will direct attention to systems rather than single issues, and to system change rather than the application of Band-Aids to present ills. It will be holistic rather than reductionist, looking ahead to the longer term rather than simply at events. Qualitative change—development—rather than quantitative change—growth—will be its goal, with social justice and equity central to its world view. Its world view will also call for respect for nature rather than a preoccupation with the management of nature. The increasingly apparent need for deep psychological changes in individuals, as well as significant restructuring of society if sustainability is to be achieved requires the direct attention of a sustainability movement that is truly inclusive in its membership and outreach. Deciding who must be at the table, defining the nature of our problems, and determining the agenda for their solutions will be a matter of high priority.

The North's consumption of resources is one cause of the world's problems, and assertions that technology will save us have to be seriously questioned. As difficult as it will be, we must begin the process of uncoupling consumption and supposed happiness in the North, including and especially the United States. The deep-seated belief that money and material goods are a measure of one's self-worth will have to be relegated to history.

Environmentalists' efforts in the 1980s led many who were not with them to feel that they were being

displaced. They saw no role for themselves in a sustainable society. For example, the agricultural chemical dealer in any American farming community in the 1980s considered himself God's servant, helping to feed the world. But by the end of the decade people were beginning to question his role, as an awareness of the effects of agricultural chemicals on the environment crept into the American psyche. Farmers and consumers became increasingly concerned about groundwater pollution, soil erosion, and chemicals in the food system. By the end of the century the agricultural chemical dealer could become the devil incarnate, unless the dealer and the agricultural system as a whole make significant changes in the way they do business.

A new sustainability movement will have to help people make the move to more sustainable livelihoods by providing its support and understanding, standing by all those who fear isolation if they change from business as usual. The lumberman in the Pacific Northwest is not a "bad person" for wanting to maintain his job if logging is restricted or banned. He must be assisted economically and psychologically in making a transition that meets his needs, society's needs, and the needs of the ecosystem. Understanding this, a sustainability movement could help accelerate the pace of change to a sustainable society.

The world's population must also be stabilized if there is to be sustainability. No problem is easily solved when population is expanding. To achieve stabilization, family planning programs are necessary but far from sufficient. These programs must be redesigned to serve a much wider range of women's reproductive health needs, and must include increasing the availability of abortion. Quality of care must also become a major focus. But the greatest energy must be directed at broadening the roles and improving the status of women, which will have salutary effects on their lives, resulting in lower fertility and better environmental quality.

But stabilization of the population is not a cure-all, even though high rates of population growth in developing countries exacerbate the problems of development and the environment. Environmental deterioration is a function of the size of a population, the per capita demand for goods and services, the nature of the technologies that provide these goods and services, and the degree to which policies, incentives, and disincentives encourage or discourage environmental sensitivity. A systemic approach to population, therefore, leads to the recognition that as the process of development improves the lives of people and fertility goes down, the demand for goods and services will increase. The poor, with good reason, will want increased access to the necessities of life, and even to life's pleasures. Thus it is likely that fewer people could have an equal or even a greater impact on the



environment unless action is taken to ensure technologies and policies that can mitigate and accommodate the people's legitimate demands. It is not yet clear what policies and technologies might raise the quality of life of the poor in ecologically sensitive ways, but focusing attention on them is a matter of highest priority.

To achieve sustainability we will also have to assign blame for unsustainability appropriately. For example, we must stop blaming the poor for large-scale environmental destruction. Policies put in place by and for elites must be recognized as a major factor in the impact poor people have on the environment. At the same time, we can no longer talk about population growth in underdeveloped countries as a cause of environmental destruction without addressing profligate consumption in the North.

Significant structural and systemic change must take place in the way we do the nation's and the world's business if we are to reach our goal of sustainability. Silvio Funtowicz, an Argentine philosopher and mathematician, set the tone for the discussion of structural change when he argued in 1991 that people should "Struggle locally, dream globally."

Protest must be linked with action that attacks present ills while defining changes that would prevent their recurrence. "Trickle-up" must become the model as grass roots activists network among themselves and with other levels of the political world. Information, people, and power must become one. The "blueprints for survival" handed down from above in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer applicable; what is needed now is dialogue and learning, with the awareness of possibly being wrong.

In the United States, campaign reform and public financing of elections will be an essential element of sustainability. "Environmental presidents" will have to do more than appear for photo opportunities. Campaign reforms, by taking the emphasis off fund raising, could shift the focus of elections to substantive issues and to candidates willing to take on the difficult task of listening to people. The quality of candidates, and thus of elected leaders, might improve. And given the continued importance of the United States in a "new world order," this could have important repercussions in other parts of the world.

A major change must also take place in universities. Knowledge has to move away from its disciplinary constraints if it is to contribute to solving the problems that hinder our attainment of a sustainable society. Transdisciplinary or nondisciplinary approaches will be needed to bring all appropriate methodologies to bear on real world issues. The scholar's question, "What do we need to know?" must be replaced if universities are to contribute in a timely and effective manner to the creation of a sustainable world. "What is our tolerance for ignorance and ambiguity while trying

to avoid harm?" will have to become the scientist's norm.

A new science—a postnormal science—is needed, pluralistic in its approach, problem focused, holistic rather than reductionist, tolerant of uncertainty, and willing to ask questions that it does not yet know how to answer. It will be concerned with process and have as a major focus not only understanding the nature of the world and its problems, but also changing the processes of structural and systemic change. As the philosophers of science Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz have observed, a postnormal science will recognize that in the real world "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent. . . . [W]hen research is called for, the problem must first be defined, and this will depend on which aspects of the issue are most salient. Hence political considerations constrain which results are produced, and thereby which policy implications are supported."

There must be a recognition in the scientific community, as Lord Kenet observed testifying in parliament on the Montreal accords, that "politics is the art of taking good decisions on insufficient evidence." The focus thus must change to data quality, rather than data completeness. As has been observed, "It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong."

Finally, it must be accepted that science is not value-free, and that the objective of science is conservation, restoration, prevention, and, ultimately, sustainability.

## THE NEW BALANCE SHEET

Since economics has become the language of politics, we need to revamp how we define the economy. A problem-oriented "ecological economics" is needed, synthesizing ecological and economic knowledge in a new paradigm for a sustainable world.

"Nature's capital" must be recognized and accounted for. The value of health—both of the populace and of nature—must be given its full weight in calculating a community's, a nation's, and the globe's economic and ecological health. No longer can we tolerate an arithmetic in which sick workers and tragedies such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill add to the gross domestic product. Prices and true costs will have to be attended to—while recognizing that not all things can be assigned a monetary value. We must accept intrinsic value, as in a giant redwood or the Grand Canyon.

"Trickle-up" must be joined by "trickle-ahead" as concerns for equity and distribution in the present and the future take precedence. As the World Bank's Herman Daly has observed, from a neoclassical economist's perspective it makes sense to kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Thus, once again, we must accept that it is the political system, as the reflection of a society's values, that must decide what is to be

protected and preserved for the present and the future. Not even a new economics can usurp that role, although it can provide a rationale for the values that make a “trickle-ahead” decision meaningful. Certainly a new economics would not penalize an individual for a future-oriented decision, but would instead encourage it.

Reducing poverty must become a high priority throughout the world. The assumption that this will occur through continued economic growth has to be reexamined, for history provides few positive lessons here. Given ecological constraints, any environmentally sensitive growth in the South must be balanced by “negative growth” in the North. At the same time, explicit attention should be paid to the ways that growth will in fact contribute to equity in a market economy. Designing plans and programs to achieve limited-term growth and long-term development with equity is among the most important challenges that we face in this last decade of the twentieth century.

Our search for sustainability will demand changes in the way we tax ourselves. Presently we tax what we want to encourage—employment and income. We must redesign our system to tax instead what we want to discourage, including resource depletion and waste in all its forms.

Trade must contribute to rather than undermine self-reliance. It must serve the environmental, social, and political goals of all nations and communities. Once again neoclassical economic concepts serve as a barrier to sustainability. “Comparative advantage” and “specialization” should no longer be prized, since they contribute to the destruction of biological and cultural diversity. For example, Ivory Coast gained little and lost much when World Bank loans encouraged it to destroy its farming base in order to supply cacao to the world market. The country’s problems were heightened when the price of cacao fell, and it was left not only without export earnings but also without food or the money to buy food for domestic consumption.

Just as in most cases we would not want to use a prescription drug before it was fully tested, so too we should resist becoming guinea pigs for new untested technologies that can be put into use without any assessment of their unintended consequences. Technol-

ogy can no longer be perceived as savior—nor need it be seen as Satan. Technology assessment must become the standard before a new technology is used. Particular effort has to go into examining possible unintended consequences of any new technologies from social, ecological, political, and economic perspectives, and in different time perspectives. Responsibility for problems deriving from the production and use of new technologies should be borne by technology developers rather than by the individuals affected or society as a whole, as is now the case. The idea of environmental assurance bonding, whereby the developer offers a bond to cover the costs of the technology’s negative impacts beyond those agreed on beforehand as “acceptable,” deserves to be debated, and tried.

### POLITICAL AND MORAL WILL

One thing is certain. Our present trajectory as a nation and as a global human community is not sustainable. While our crystal ball for divining the future is cloudy, the outlines, if not the details, of the things we need to do can be seen.

Pessimism being a self-fulfilling prophecy, optimism is the only course. We must believe we have the political and moral will to change directions, and act to make that belief a reality. We cannot be complacent; with each passing year, the windows of opportunity for change are narrowing. We must accept the moral imperative to preserve the planet for all its inhabitants—human and nonhuman—now and in the future.

Poet, novelist, essayist, and farmer Wendell Berry has suggested that “the answers to human problems of ecology are to found in the economy. And answers to the problems of the economy are to be found in human culture and character.”

We must be prepared to assert victory rather than assuming we can change the minds of those who prefer to pursue business as usual. We must appeal to logic and science, but not fear spirit and emotion. What is needed is a new vision, not correction of a faulty vision. If necessity is the mother of invention, then the crisis we now face must be the mother of structural and systemic reform and action. In the words of Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel, “We aim at preventing future generations from inheriting our past as their future.” ■

## BOOK REVIEWS

### DEFINING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

#### **The Cold War is Over—Again**

By Allen Lynch. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992.

208 pp., \$44.00, cloth; \$15.95, paper.

#### **In Search of a New World Order:**

#### **The Future of U.S.-European Relations**

Edited by Henry Brandon. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 177 pp., \$19.95.

#### **Justice and World Order**

By Janna Thompson. London: Routledge, 1992. 211 pp., \$16.95.

Political language is, like those who speak it, notoriously pliable and subject to varied contradictory and ambiguous readings. Even by these elastic standards, the phrase "new world order" is exceptionally vague. In contrast to Wilson's Fourteen Points or France's Declaration of the Rights of Man, the phrase has no charter to turn its slogan into policy, and it implies no more specific action than embracing novelty itself. Since this "order" leaves open how, by whom, and to what end the world should be organized, any analysis of the term demands a stiff dose of linguistic precision and political context. Without it, every glimpse of chaos emanating from Bosnia, Somalia, or Foggy Bottom collides with the rhetorical new order, hastening its journey from inspiration to platitude to irony at frightening speed.

Yet the search for grounding political principles is not as easy as it was in Truman's day. With so much of the world engaged in sociopolitical overhaul, the old network of superpower alliances, ideology, and mutually assured destruction is frayed, with nothing to take its place. Proclaimed by President Bush at the end of the cold war and just before the Soviet implosion, many assume that the new world order implies the triumph of industrial capitalism and *realpolitik*. Others hope that the new order signals the end of bloody international conflict, and the dawn of cooperative efforts toward a more equitable world.

Forsaking the debate over the meaning of the cold war's end, Allen Lynch's *The Cold War is Over—Again* attacks its premise, arguing that the cold war actually ended in the 1960s and early 1970s, sometime between the Cuban missile crisis and SALT I. This is an intriguing idea, and Lynch correctly cites the panoply of carefully contained proxy battles, back-channel communications, and calibrated rhetoric that gave the superpowers an unprecedented capacity to control their own rivalry over the past three decades—and ensure a "firmly established" balance of power. A long-dead cold war also serves as a tempting rationale

for the West's supreme reluctance to let the Soviet Union die; never before has an avowedly godless, craven enemy been held so dear by its erstwhile foes.

Yet Lynch's thesis runs into trouble by mistaking a regulated rivalry for none at all. Yes, each superpower accepted a divided Germany in a divided Europe, and the threat of nuclear cataclysm was a brake on large-scale adventures elsewhere, military or otherwise. But surely the present condition of the United States and the remains of the Soviet Union indicates that the conflict exacted a horrifying toll right to its end; bloated military budgets have greatly accelerated the pace of social decay in the United States, and played an instrumental role in the Soviet Union's dissolution.

*The Cold War is Over—Again* also suffers from a Eurocentric bias that would make Dean Acheson blush. Trying to transform the 1960s into a "long process... that would yield detente and the post-Cold War era by the early 1970's," Lynch completely ignores other parts of the world, most notably Vietnam. One would like to think that Southeast Asia would be a required stopping point for any account of cold war politics, but not for Lynch. The region and its wars are never mentioned, despite the tens of thousands of lives lost and the billions of dollars spent to keep an area with little strategic value from becoming Communist. There are plenty of openings for revisionism in the debate about the end of the cold war, but avoiding obvious historical facts shouldn't be one of them.

Unfortunately, obvious remarks—or what passed for them a year or two ago—flow from the pages of *In Search of a New World Order*, a series of essays edited by the journalist Henry Brandon. Several contributors hail the Maastricht treaty as an expression of general European enthusiasm for ever greater economic unity that will quickly extend to military and even political cohesion. But as the electorate's response showed, these predictions are a sobering reminder that in a period of epochal shifts on the international scene, today's received wisdom might be tomorrow's blunder. Other observations are guaranteed to stand time's trials by sheer vapidty: "We cannot deny that there have been ups and downs in the relations between the United States and the western part of the European continent" may be a safe conclusion for a political essay, but it hardly raises confidence that these reflections on the new world order are worth the effort.

An exception to the book's general banality is James Schlesinger's insightful chapter on Euro-American relations. He predicts that European unity "will likely be far less immediate and far less extreme than advertised," and that America will feel a nostalgic tug toward cold



war thinking and institutions. Schlesinger also recognizes that Europe has little faith in the implicit millenarianism of a new world order; he observes that "Europeans have either become inured to or learned to be patient with these waves of American enthusiasm."

Of course, anti-utopianism is more than a European phenomenon; it is one of the dominant cultural poses of the contemporary West. Our *fin de siècle* is notable for its lack of utopian creeds, and for the absence of any general aspiration to find one. Those looking to promote universal peace and justice must do so cautiously, even timidly, with abundant qualifications about gradualism and occasional setbacks. Such is the tone of Janna Thompson's *Justice and World Order*, which tries to build the case for justice around Enlightenment thinkers, particularly Kant. Thompson's focus on rationalist, "real-world" solutions to international justice liberates her book from some of the obtuse cant that blemishes postmodern philosophy. It is refreshing to read a text that combines an authentic search for moral order while conceding the ubiquity of injustice in human affairs; this path avoids the easier philosophical exits of explaining away all our failings as the product of this or that economic system or cultural codependent—or inexcusably abandoning moral considerations altogether.

Unfortunately, Thompson is content to take the Enlightenment's faith in the transformative power of rationality and pluralism at face value, and this limits the scope and depth of her argument. This is more than a theoretical failing. Our century has seen several pluralist, industrial societies descend into "ethnic cleansings" and "Final Solutions" with appalling velocity, transforming neighbors and co-workers into purveyors of atrocity, accomplishing barbaric ends with the most efficient and technologically advanced means available.

This past—and present—points to the fragility of a rational, integrated social order. Without widespread faith in the dignity and worth of every human being, the construction of Thompson's "overlapping communities" and "mutually acceptable structures and institutions for the resolution of disputes" is always susceptible to subversion by hatreds (rational or not) from within, an unpleasant truth too pervasive for any contemporary philosopher to avoid. History, especially recent history, has not smiled on schemes for world justice that rely on mechanistic theories of social organization; and a new world order worthy of its name will find another path to justice, one that concedes the primacy of moral education and limits the ease with which bestial hatreds are perpetuated by twenty-first century armaments.

What is most remarkable about these books on the new world order is that underneath their different approaches, each rests on a common foundation: the inexorable spread of limitless free-market economic

growth; the futility of making moral distinctions between cultures, while simultaneously relying on the West as the supreme observer and gauge of political possibility; in sum, the idea that—save for some wiry knots of oppression here and there—the moral work of history is done. We have seen the future, these authors hint, and it is GATT. From this perspective, the new world order is nothing more than a forward-looking version of Fukuyama's "end of History."

Of course, complacent projections of present trends into infinity has a venerable lineage in Western prognostication. Many nineteenth-century observers considered the Concert of Europe to be a permanent fixture of world affairs; those who lived long enough were dealt a lesson in humility by World War I. The European Revolution was a historical inevitability in the 1790s before dying in the early 1800s; incredibly, it became inevitable once more in the late 1840s before being interred in the *laissez-faire* soil of the late nineteenth century, where it awaited resurrection in Bolshevik Russia before dying in the Brezhnev era. As recently as six or seven years ago, the NATO/Warsaw Pact dichotomy seemed to divide the world as inexorably as day is divided from night until it unraveled in 1989. Wise Men are drawn toward what Ortega y Gasset labeled "the belief that the world will be, in all essentials, as it is today." Events almost always prove them wrong.

So, of what stuff will the new world order be made? Communism, with its anti-individualism and perverse contempt for initiative and achievement, seems destined for the same ghoulish afterlife as Fascism, and its exile from political viability is equally well deserved. The appeal of a global system of free enterprise seems assured well into the future, and where it exists, democracy has attained an admirable stability.

Yet will so many other dreams of the past century—equal opportunity between and within nations, disarmament, the end of hunger and preventable diseases, an appreciation of materialism's environmental and spiritual limits—continue to be like, Hester Prynne, shunned as a temptress and blamed for the failings of their suitors? With less than a quarter of the world's population consuming an unsustainable 80 percent of global production; with 800 million people in abject poverty and over 1 billion illiterates around the globe; with desperately poor third world countries spending what little money they have on standing armies and weaponry, the idea that future conflicts will be confined to "brushfire wars," tariff disputes, and paneled conference rooms in Geneva seems not only naive but dangerous. If there is to be any lasting global order, there must be an honest international effort to address the violence, poverty, and ignorance in our world. Without it, the phrase "new world order" will prove as evanescent as its political creators, and both will pass into history not as precedents, but as footnotes.

Matthew W. Maguire ■

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

FEBRUARY 1993

## INTERNATIONAL

### Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Feb. 16—In Vienna, the 12-member organization agrees to reduce its output from 25 million barrels of oil per day to 23.5 million beginning March 1.

### United Nations (UN)

(See *Bosnia and Herzegovina*; *Bulgaria*; *Cambodia*; *Haiti*; *Lebanon*; *Myanmar*; *Somalia*)

## AFGHANISTAN

Feb. 9—The governor of Paktia province, Nasrullah Mansour, is killed by a land mine; Mansour, a prominent guerrilla leader during the war against the Soviet-backed government, is the highest-ranking official to be killed since the guerrillas took power last year.

## ALBANIA

(See *Bulgaria*)

## ALGERIA

Feb. 20—*The Economist* reports an assassination attempt in Algiers against General Khaled Nezzar, the minister of defense and strongman on the ruling High Council of State; no group claimed responsibility; this week security forces arrested 700 people suspected of selling arms to Islamic militants.

## ARGENTINA

Feb. 12—In Buenos Aires, the government signs an agreement with the US that allows it to purchase previously restricted nuclear, computer, and aeronautic technology while also imposing strict controls on the transfer of this technology outside Argentina.

## AUSTRALIA

Feb. 7—Prime Minister Paul Keating announces that a general election will be held March 13.

## BELGIUM

(See *Zaire*)

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

(See also *Israel*; *US*)

Feb. 2—United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata orders the organization's aid convoys to stop using the main road between Mostar and Sarajevo after 1 person is killed and another wounded in an attack on a UN convoy by undisclosed forces.

Feb. 6—In Zagreb, Croatia, a UNHCR spokesman announces that more than 5,000 Muslims have recently fled to Tuzla from the eastern municipalities of Cerska, Kamenica, and Zvornik during so-called "ethnic cleansing" operations conducted by Serb militias backed by the Yugoslav army.

Feb. 7—As many as 4,000 Muslims have been expelled by Serb militias from the eastern town of Trebinje and many of their

homes taken over by Serbs in recent weeks, *The New York Times* reports.

Sarajevo radio reports Croat militias have forced Muslims from their homes near the town of Novi Travnik in the last several days; fighting between Croats and Muslims has also broken out near the towns of Gornji Vakuf and Travnik since the proposal last month by the UN and the European Community of a peace plan that would give Croats control of the area.

Feb. 10—As many as 54 people are killed and 109 wounded in clashes near Srebrenica and Zvornik between Serb militias and Bosnian government forces.

Feb. 13—UN relief operations to Sarajevo are suspended after President Alija Izetbegovic's announcement yesterday that the aid would not be distributed to the city's 380,000 residents unless similar relief efforts were launched for Muslim communities in the eastern part of Bosnia.

Feb. 17—After capturing the town of Kamenica from government troops, Serbs report that they have found the bodies of at least 23 Serbs in unmarked graves.

Feb. 18—In New York, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reverses a decision yesterday by Ogata to suspend the agency's relief operations in Bosnia until warring factions agree to guarantee the safety of relief convoys; as many as 1.6 million people are at risk from exposure, hunger, and disease.

Feb. 21—After being stalled for several days on the border with Serbia by Serb forces, a UN convoy carrying 65 tons of relief supplies reaches the Muslim community of Zepa in eastern Bosnia.

Feb. 23—Serb forces shell Sarajevo, killing at least 5 people and wounding 20; at least 5 shells hit a mosque where Muslims had gathered to pray on the first day of the Muslim holy month Ramadan.

Feb. 25—Serb militiamen allow a UN relief convoy of 12 trucks to reach the Muslim town of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia; the Serbs had detained the convoy for 2 days.

Feb. 28—Several US military C-130 cargo planes take off from Rhein-Main air force base in Germany carrying crates of relief supplies that will be air-dropped over eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## BULGARIA

Feb. 16—Government forces on the Danube River detain a Greek-owned ship, the *Adventure*, carrying 5,000 tons of steel from the Yugoslav republic of Serbia and suspected of violating the total economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN last May; earlier this month, the government signed its 1st cooperation agreement with Albania since the end of the cold war; it has also pledged, along with Greece, to help contain the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## CAMBODIA

Feb. 2—Prime Minister Hun Sen says he has ordered an end to a government offensive against the Khmer Rouge in north-central and western Cambodia that began January 29; he says the action was intended to regain territory lost since the October 1991 peace treaty and to protect farmers harvesting crops; the government says 51 Khmer Rouge guerrillas and 5

government troops died in the fighting, which the UN termed a major breach of the peace accords.

## CANADA

Feb. 24—Brian Mulroney announces he is resigning as leader of the Conservative party and as prime minister, a post he has held since 1984; Mulroney will continue as prime minister until a mid-June Conservative leadership conference preparatory to elections this fall; Mulroney is believed to have resigned because of a lingering recession.

## CHINA

(See also US)

Feb. 1—The government announces the early release from prison of Wang Xizhe, who was active in the 1978–1979 Democracy Wall movement, and Gao Shan, a former government official jailed after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

Feb. 17—The government announces the release from prison of Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng, student leaders in the 1989 democracy movement; it says all students held in connection with the movement have now been released, although several are reportedly still in custody.

## COLOMBIA

(See also Venezuela)

Feb. 10—In Barrancabermeja, a car bomb explodes in an auto repair shop, killing 14 people and wounding as many as 25 others; police say they have no suspects.

Feb. 15—In Bogotá, 4 people are killed and more than 100 wounded by 2 car bomb explosions; no one takes responsibility for the attacks.

## COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

Feb. 4—The parliament of Belarus, voting 218 to 1 with 60 abstentions, ratifies the 1st Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by the Soviet Union and the US in 1991, and also approves adherence to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Ukraine is now the only former Soviet republic party to the treaty that has not ratified it.

On a visit to Tajikistan, Russia's defense minister, General Pavel Grachev, agrees to help build a new Tajik army around the core of the militia loyal to Sangak Safarov, who controls the government after his fighters defeated an Islamic-democratic coalition in a civil war that began last spring.

Feb. 7—At a demonstration last week in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, as many as 100,000 people called for the resignation of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, *The New York Times* reports; the prime minister was replaced last week. A blockade by Azerbaijan and a fuel crisis have virtually shut down the economy; most workers have been on furlough at half pay.

Feb. 13—*The New York Times* reports on a government crackdown on political dissent in Uzbekistan, where President Islam Karimov has outlawed religious-based parties. Opposition leaders have been arrested on charges including treason, among them Abdumannob Pulatov, chairman of the Uzbek Human Rights Committee, who last month was sentenced to 3 years in prison for slandering the president but was then pardoned by the judge; 11 members of Birlilik (Unity) and as many as 20 members of the Islamic Renaissance party have also been arrested.

Feb. 25—The international environmental group Greenpeace releases a report detailing accidents involving Moscow's nuclear-powered submarines; the report lists at least 4 partial meltdowns of nuclear reactors and a 1985 explosion at a

shipyard during servicing; dozens of Soviet military personnel died as a result of the incidents.

## COMORO ISLANDS

(See France)

## COSTA RICA

(See Venezuela)

## CROATIA

Feb. 8—Government troops and Serb militias clash near Zadar; both sides say they have initiated offensives. *Borba*, a Belgrade newspaper, reports the village of Kasici has been destroyed by army and Serb attacks.

Initial returns from yesterday's elections for the 63-member Upper House of Districts show President Franjo Tudjman's nationalist Democratic Union party winning as many as 30 seats, giving it a clear majority over the other 26 participating parties; the Democratic Union already controls 61% of the lower house of parliament; approximately 58% of the country's 3.6 million eligible voters cast ballots; the election was monitored by a 5-member European Community team.

Feb. 13—The Tanyug news agency in Belgrade reports government forces have retreated from the town of Novigrad, near Zadar.

## CYPRUS

Feb. 7—Left-wing President George Vassiliou captures 44.2% of the vote in today's balloting for president, while his conservative opponent, Glafcos Clerides, wins 36.7%; Paschalides receives 18.6%.

Feb. 14—Clerides is elected president with 50.28% of the vote over Vassiliou's 49.72% in a runoff election.

## EGYPT

Feb. 27—The militant Islamic Group takes responsibility for yesterday's bomb explosion in a coffee shop in downtown Cairo that killed 4 people and wounded 16 others; many of the victims were foreigners.

## EL SALVADOR

(See Venezuela)

## FRANCE

(See also Vietnam; Zaire)

Feb. 1—Bob Denard, for 30 years a mercenary leader in countries including Benin, Zaire, Angola, and Iran, surrenders to police in Paris in a prearranged arrest; he is charged with murder and theft in connection with the 1989 assassination of Ahmed Abdallah, president of the Comoro Islands.

Feb. 11—The government suspends aid to Togo because of the breakdown of a multiparty conference on democracy; France is the country's largest donor.

## GERMANY

Feb. 3—Police in 9 states raid studios and homes of record companies and right-wing rock bands accused of spreading racial hatred; they seize about 30,000 compact discs, cassette tapes, and records.

Feb. 4—The Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, lowers its discount rate from 8.25% to 8%; the action is intended to reduce speculation in other European currencies.



**GREECE**(See *Bulgaria*; *US*)**GUATEMALA**(See *Venezuela*)**HAITI**(See also *US*)

Feb. 4—UN envoy Dante Caputo leaves the country after the military-backed government of Prime Minister Marc Bazin rejects a plan to deploy hundreds of UN and Organization of American States (OAS) human rights observers that it agreed to last month.

Feb. 9—Reversing its earlier decision, the Bazin administration announces it will allow as many as 500 UN and OAS human rights observers to operate in the country.

Feb. 26—Shouting "Aristide or death!" about 2,500 people demonstrate in the port city of Jérémie during a funeral mass for the estimated 600 to 900 people who died when the ferry *Neptune* capsized last week; it is the largest demonstration in support of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide since he was ousted from power in September 1991.

Feb. 28—The independent Haitian Press Agency says soldiers yesterday beat and arrested people distributing pictures of Aristide near the cathedral in Jérémie and broke up another demonstration.

**HONDURAS**(See *Venezuela*)**INDIA**

Feb. 4—*The New York Times* reports that transcripts of police radio band conversations and other evidence show that police at all but the most senior levels cooperated with Hindu mobs in anti-Muslim violence last month in Bombay organized by the group Shiv Sena (Lord Shiva's Army); 600 people were killed and 2,000 injured, most of them Muslims.

Feb. 25—In New Delhi, more than 100,000 paramilitary troops and police prevent a demonstration called for by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party; some 45,000 suspected Hindu militants in various cities had been arrested previously, and as many as 5,000 people in New Delhi, including 110 Bharatiya Janata members of parliament, are detained today; at least 54 people are hospitalized; Bharatiya Janata, the largest opposition party in parliament, is urging the resignation of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's government.

**ISRAEL**(See also *Lebanon*)

Feb. 6—Troops kill 3 Palestinians in a street clash in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip; army officials announce 3 other Palestinians were killed in Gaza yesterday after they opened fire on Israeli troops.

Feb. 7—In Tel Aviv, a US State Department spokesman says the US has formally complained to the Israeli government about the denial of consular access to and the treatment of 3 Palestinian-Americans arrested last month for suspected involvement with militant Islamic groups, including Hamas; the Israeli military has said military law does not require it to provide the 3 with access to representation or consulate officials.

Feb. 9—Militant Palestinians in Gaza shoot and kill 1 Jew and wound an Israeli Arab.

Feb. 10—In Gaza, soldiers shoot and kill 2 Palestinians who threatened them with axes.

Feb. 11—Using anti-tank rockets and explosives, soldiers destroy or seriously damage 10 houses in Khan Yunis in Gaza during their search for suspected members of Qassam, a branch of Hamas; 4 suspects and 10 of their alleged collaborators are arrested.

Speaking on television after his release, 1 of the 3 Palestinian-Americans arrested last month says he was beaten during interrogation.

Feb. 14—In Nablus in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, soldiers shoot and kill 1 Palestinian during a stone-throwing demonstration.

Feb. 15—In Jerusalem, 1 Israeli is stabbed and killed and another wounded by an Arab attacker; 1 Israeli is seriously wounded in a stone-throwing attack by Palestinians.

Feb. 16—The government issues temporary visas to 84 Muslim refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina who will be resettled in Arab municipalities.

Feb. 17—In Gaza City, troops shoot and kill 1 Palestinian and wound another who violated a curfew.

In the West Bank, soldiers kill 2 Palestinians in clashes during military operations.

Feb. 18—In Gaza, troops shoot and kill 1 Palestinian during a raid on the village of Illar.

**ITALY**

Feb. 11—Bettino Craxi, head of the Socialist party since 1976 and several times prime minister, announces his resignation from the party after being served with 6 separate "notices of investigation" for allegedly corrupt practices in a Milan bribery and kickbacks scandal.

Feb. 19—Finance Minister Giovanni Goria and Health Minister Francesco De Lorenzo resign after being linked to the Milan scandal; Justice Minister Claudio Martelli left the cabinet February 10 because of the scandal.

Feb. 25—Giorgio La Malfa, head of the Republican party, resigns after being informed he is under scrutiny for alleged violations of campaign-financing laws that supporters say are not connected with the Milan scandal.

Giampiero Pesenti, a construction industry magnate, is placed under house arrest in Milan on charges that he paid bribes of more than \$2 million each to the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties. More than 120 people have been arrested in connection with the Milan scandal, and more than 500 politicians, civil servants, and businesspeople, including at least 50 members of parliament, are under investigation; magistrates say 7 people accused of involvement in the scandal have committed suicide.

**JAPAN**(See also *US*)

Feb. 4—The Bank of Japan, the country's central bank, cuts the discount rate to 2.5% from 3.25%; this is expected to stimulate the economy and reduce the foreign trade deficit.

**KENYA**(See also *US*)

Feb. 5—*The New York Times* reports that last week President Daniel arap Moi dissolved parliament on the 2d day of its session, an action that is legal under the constitution; Moi's ruling Kenya National African Union party won general elections held December 29, the country's 1st multiparty elections in 26 years, but received only 36.3% of the vote.

**KOREA, SOUTH**

Feb. 9—After being indicted for embezzlement and violations of election law, Chung Ju Yung, founder of the United People's party and founder and former chairman of the Hyundai

Group, the country's largest conglomerate, announces his retirement from politics; Chung placed 3d in the presidential elections last December.

## LEBANON

Feb. 16—Members of the UN Interim Force withdraw from the villages of Maarakeh, Janata, and Yanouh and 400 members of the Lebanese army occupy the positions; the move was made because of increasing tensions between the Israeli army and Muslim fundamentalist groups.

Israeli troops and Israel-backed South Lebanon Army militiamen fire artillery into Shiite villages just outside Israel's self-declared security zone in the south, killing at least 2 Party of God guerrillas; the action is in retaliation for an attack by the Iranian-backed rebels on a South Lebanon Army outpost.

Feb. 17—At least 2 Party of God rebels are killed and several wounded in a daylong artillery and rocket battle between the guerrillas and Israeli troops and South Lebanon Army militia in and around the security zone.

## LIBYA

Feb. 17—US officials say they have evidence Libya is constructing an underground chemical-weapons plant near Tarhunah; Libya was not a party to last month's UN convention prohibiting chemical weapons, signed by more than 100 nations.

## LITHUANIA

Feb. 15—Algirdas Brazauskas, who was elected president yesterday with 60% of the vote, renounces his Communist past and promises to speed up privatization; Brazauskas was chief of Lithuania's Communist party when it broke with Moscow in 1990.

## MADAGASCAR

Feb. 10—With 90% of the votes counted in today's presidential election, Albert Zafy, a reformist leader of Active Forces, an opposition coalition, appears to have defeated President Didier Ratsiraka by a 2-to-1 margin; Ratsiraka has been in office 18 years.

## MYANMAR

Feb. 19—Five Nobel Peace Prize winners gathered in Thailand call for Myanmar's suspension from the UN and the imposition of a total arms embargo until the government ends human rights abuses and releases political prisoners including fellow Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Myanmar's democracy movement.

## NETHERLANDS

Feb. 9—Parliament, by a 91-45 vote, approves a law that permits euthanasia under strict conditions for a terminally ill patient who requests it.

## NICARAGUA

(See Venezuela)

## NIGER

Feb. 28—Nearly complete results from yesterday's presidential election show Mamadou Tandja of the National Movement for a Development Society, the former ruling party, won 34% of the vote and Ousmane Mahamane of the Social Democratic Convention 28%; the 2 will compete in a runoff next month; postponed 5 times, this was the country's 1st multi-party election since independence in 1960.

## PERU

(See also US)

Feb. 5—In northern Puno department, 3 soldiers were killed in a January 30 battle with Maoist Shining Path guerrillas that left 8 rebels dead and 20 wounded, *The New York Times* reports. According to the Legal Defense Institute, a Lima-based human rights group, the guerrillas have conducted 474 attacks in which 365 people have been killed since the arrest in September of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso.

Feb. 18—Convicted of taking part in the failed coup attempt against President Alberto Fujimori in November, 28 military officers are sentenced to prison terms ranging from 6 months to 8 years.

## SLOVAKIA

Feb. 15—Michael Kovac, a member of the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, is elected president by parliament; Slovakia became independent January 1 when Czechoslovakia split into 2 countries.

## SOMALIA

(See also US)

Feb. 2—*The New York Times* reports General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of 1 of the 2 largest factions in the civil war, said last month that a proposed UN takeover of the US-led relief mission by troops from a multinational coalition would amount to a "UN trusteeship over Somalia," and that Somalis would oppose it.

Feb. 8—A spokesman for UNICEF says it will attempt to vaccinate 750,000 children against measles, which killed 75,000 Somali youngsters last year; presently, hundreds of people die each week from the disease.

Feb. 24—After more than 2 months of relative calm in Mogadishu, looting and violent demonstrations erupt in the capital after calls from Aidid for demonstrations against the foreign presence in the country; Aidid said US-led troops in the southern city of Kismayu favor a rival faction headed by Mohammed Said Hersi, also known as General Morgan; American estimates put Somali casualties in the riot at 10 dead and 17 wounded; US military officials say no casualties were caused by coalition troops.

Feb. 25—In a protest in southern Mogadishu against coalition demands that they disarm, Somali gunmen fire on coalition troops almost continuously for 6 hours; Nigerian troops in charge of the area respond with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns; 1 Somali is killed and 3 US marines and 2 Nigerian soldiers are wounded.

## SOUTH AFRICA

Feb. 18—The African National Congress (ANC) approves a plan for the transition to nonracial democracy; an interim parliament will be elected for a 5-year period, during which it will draft a new constitution; minority parties that receive at least 5% of the national popular vote will be guaranteed cabinet posts; the pact was reached in talks with the white-dominated government.

Feb. 20—The ANC rolls back its date for advising the lifting of remaining sanctions against South Africa, saying sanctions may be lifted once the election day is set and a transitional executive council is established, rather than when the actual balloting for the transitional parliament is held.

Feb. 21—President F. W. de Klerk names 3 nonwhites—2 members of the mixed-race parliament and an Indian lawyer—to minor cabinet posts; the cabinet has been exclusively white except for a short period prior to 1987 under de Klerk's predecessor, P. W. Botha.

**TOGO**(See *France*; *US*)**UNITED KINGDOM (UK)****Great Britain**

Feb. 27—A bomb blast on a London shopping street injures 12 people, 2 seriously; the Irish Republican Army had issued 2 warnings before the explosion; yesterday the IRA took responsibility for 3 explosions that destroyed a massive gas storage tank in Warrington, 165 miles northeast of London.

**UNITED STATES (US)**(See also *Argentina*; *CIS*; *Israel*; *Libya*; *Somalia*; *Zaire*)

Feb. 5—In Honolulu, Coast Guard officials say that 2 days ago they found 500 Chinese passengers aboard a cargo ship 1,500 miles southwest of Hawaii who were to be smuggled into the US; last year the Coast Guard intercepted more than 500 Chinese attempting to enter the country illegally.

Feb. 8—The administration of President Bill Clinton announces it has instructed the Department of Health and Human Services to remove from the list of conditions that block a person's entry into the country the following: syphilis, leprosy, and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS; only infectious tuberculosis remains on the list; since the ban on HIV-infected people was imposed in 1987, about 600 people annually were barred from entering; the announcement comes on the 12th day of a hunger strike by 274 HIV-infected Haitian refugees held at a US naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, who are seeking political asylum.

Feb. 11—In New York, an armed man of either Somali or Ethiopian nationality surrenders to federal authorities after hijacking a plane with 10 crew members and 94 passengers from Frankfurt, Germany; it is the 1st trans-Atlantic hijacking in 16 years.

Feb. 18—In Miami, an armed man surrenders to police after hijacking a missionary plane with 10 American passengers aboard; the man took a Haitian soldier hostage and forced his way onto the plane in Cap-Haïtien, Haiti.

Feb. 21—In Lomé, the capital of Togo, US embassy officials have announced the suspension of all but the most critical aid to the nation because of the killing of opposition demonstrators and other anti-democratic actions, *The New York Times* reports.

Feb. 22—State Department officials say they have information that a ship presently off the coast of Africa and sailing under the Greek flag is "apparently" carrying arms from Yugoslavia to Kenya for eventual shipment to Somalia; the UN has imposed a total economic embargo against Yugoslavia and an arms embargo against Somalia.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher lands in Beirut in show of support for Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's government; Lebanon is one of the stops Christopher has made in his 1st trip to the Middle East.

Feb. 24—Administration officials announce that the American and Japanese governments will participate in a \$2-billion loan program to restore Peru's international credit status.

Feb. 25—Clinton announces US military cargo planes will soon begin delivering relief supplies to besieged Muslim communities in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Feb. 26—In New York, a bomb explosion at the World Trade Center kills at least 5 people; as many as 1,000 suffer from smoke inhalation and other injuries; no one takes responsibility for the bombing.

**VENEZUELA**

Feb. 12—In Caracas, government officials and representatives from Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua sign an agreement that will lead to fully free regional trade by the end of the decade; El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras plan to abolish all trade duties by March 1.

**VIETNAM**

Feb. 9—French President François Mitterrand becomes the first Western head of state since 1966 to visit Vietnam; he pledges to double aid—which last year totaled \$30 million—if the government improves its human rights record.


**YUGOSLAVIA**(See *Bulgaria*; *US*)**ZAIRE**

Feb. 3—In the heaviest fighting yet in unrest that began January 28, troops supporting the democracy movement and army units backing President Mobutu Sese Seko battle in Kinshasa, the capital; about 1,000 people, most of them soldiers, have been killed in rioting and subsequent fighting between army factions. Over the weekend troops airlifted from Belgium and France evacuated more than 1,000 foreigners. The US, France, and Belgium—Zaire's 3 largest creditors—demand that Mobutu, who has ruled Zaire since 1965, abide by a previous accord and transfer power to the transitional government under Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi.

Feb. 5—Mobutu announces he is dismissing Tshisekedi because the prime minister failed to nominate a new cabinet after Mobutu dissolved the government in December; Tshisekedi, the leader of Zaire's democracy movement, was elected prime minister in August 1992 by the National Conference, a forum of political leaders; it is unclear whether Mobutu has the power to dismiss him.

Feb. 26—Members of the special presidential guard release some 800 lawmakers they had held hostage in the parliament building in Kinshasa since February 24; troops say legislators have agreed to cooperate with Mobutu. ■





## CURRENT HISTORY IN MAY: AFRICA

Most African nations go it alone as they struggle to stay in one piece. In the east, famine and clan-based fighting tear relentlessly at the social fabric in Somalia. To the west, ethnic fighting and gangster-like leadership in Liberia have reduced the idea of the country as a unified entity to a figure on a map. Southward, Angola and Mozambique face opposite outcomes to their cold-war catalyzed civil wars. And in the north, the dust has yet to settle in Sudan, as millions have been displaced as a result of religious and ethnic fighting.

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